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This Article examines a form of securities class action
that is growing increasinglypopular in U.S. courts:
the 'foreign-cubed"action, brought against a foreign
issuer on behalf of a class that includesforeign investors who purchasedsecurities on a foreign exchange.
These cases are becoming an important part of the
regulatory landscape, and they create the potentialfor
particularlysevere conflict with other countries on the
question of how best to regulate global economic activity. Yet they point out quite clearly that the traditional conduct and effects tests for subject-matterjurisdiction are inadequate to the task of delimiting the
reach of U.S. securities laws in the global capital
markets. The Article draws on a study of forty-five
foreign-cubed claims. It analyzes the arguments made
by foreign investors seeking to justify the application
of U.S. law to their claims-arguments that base an
expansive theory of regulatoryjurisdiction on the interconnections among the world's capital markets. It
then turns to judicial disposition of such claims, addressing the various stages of litigation (including
class certification) at which courts confront jurisdic* Professor of Law and Louis F. Neizer Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington. Thanks to Donna Nagy and Margaret Sachs, as well as participants at
the Global Law Workshop at Duke Law School and faculty workshops at the University of
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tional questions and identifying a series of assumptions that courts make in attempting to drawjurisdictional lines. Examining those assumptions, the Article
concludes that courts operating within the currentjurisdictionalframework cannot adequately manage the
regulatory conflicts that foreign-cubed claims present. It therefore supports a jurisdictionallimit based
on the location of investment transactions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The globalization of financial markets has brought about the
globalization of securities litigation. Given the prevalence of multiple listings, global offerings, and other cross-border capital-raising
activity, foreign entities are increasingly likely to participate in secu-
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rities litigation before U.S. courts-as plaintiffs, in the case of foreign investors, or as defendants, in the case of foreign issuers.1 Such
litigation, arising from conduct with foreign as well as U.S. elements,
raises questions regarding the reach of U.S. securities law into the
global capital markets. Considering the stakes involved,2 one might
expect that the scope of subject-matter jurisdiction under the federal
securities laws would by now be firmly established. Quite the opposite is true. Congress has enacted no legislation on the point, the Supreme Court has declined to address the question, and the lower federal courts apply in inconsistent and therefore unpredictable ways a
pair of judicially created jurisdictional tests that are now almost 40
years old.
A particular form of securities litigation has arrived onto this
scene that both highlights and heightens the confusion surrounding
jurisdictional analysis: the multinational class action. I define this as
an action brought against a foreign issuer, on behalf of a plaintiff
class that includes not only investors who purchased the securities in
question on a U.S. securities exchange, but also foreign investors
who purchased the securities on a foreign securities exchange. These
cases, sometimes described as "foreign cubed, ' 3 present some especially thorny jurisdictional questions. They warrant particular attention for several reasons. First, the rate of such claims is increasing,
and courts will face these complicated cases more frequently in the
future. Second, the U.S. plaintiffs' bar is taking deliberate steps to
cultivate potential foreign claimants, 4 and that activity is likely to
heighten a conflict between the United States and other countries
over cross-border securities litigation that has until now remained essentially latent. Third, these cases reveal a growing but unexamined
disjuncture between the jurisdictional rules that courts apply in securities cases and the market efficiency-based aspects of substantive
anti-fraud doctrine. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, these
cases can be used as a lens through which to examine the framing assumptions that courts bring to their analysis of jurisdiction under the
1. A 2004 study concluded that the number of class actions brought against foreign
issuers tripled between 1996 and 2004. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2004 FOREIGN
SECURITIES
LITIGATION
STUDY
4
(2004),
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/gx/eng/cfr/gecs/pwc_2004_foreign-seclit.pdf.
2. Regulatory stakes, of course, but also financial ones. A 2005 report of the United
States Treasury Department estimated foreign holdings of U.S. equities at $2,144 billion, of
U.S. long-term debt at $4,118 billion, and of U.S. short-term debt at $602 billion. U.S.
TREASURY, REPORT ON FOREIGN PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES AS OF 6/30/2005 3
(2006), availableat http://www.treas.gov/tic/shl2005r.pdf.
3. Stuart M. Grant & Diane Zilka, The Role of Foreign Investors in FederalSecurities
Class Actions, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (NUMBER

1442) 91, 96 (Practicing L. Inst. ed., 2004).
4. See infra Part V.B.2.
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securities laws. That examination can help clarify the particular
regulatory interests to which courts respond most strongly when addressing cross-border cases, and thereby provide a basis for assessing
the viability of various proposed solutions to jurisdictional conflict.
This Article examines multinational class actions under federal securities laws, based on a study of forty-five claims filed between 1996 and 2005 on behalf of multinational classes. 5 It approaches these claims from the perspective both of the plaintiffs,
analyzing the specific arguments they make to justify the application
of U.S. securities law, and of the courts, examining their disposition
of these arguments. The Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets out
the law governing subject-matter jurisdiction in securities claims,
outlining the different bases on which courts assert jurisdiction over
claims with foreign elements. Part III turns to the specific challenges
that multinational class actions present. It examines the various
points during litigation at which courts confront jurisdictional questions, and considers the success rate of foreign claimants seeking inclusion in multinational classes. Part IV expands that analysis, examining the specific arguments that foreign investors make in their
attempts to establish subject-matter jurisdiction over their claims.
These arguments are based on the interconnections among today's
capital markets, and illustrate particularly clearly the weaknesses of
the traditional jurisdictional tests. They also reveal the points at
which these tests no longer square with those aspects of U.S. antifraud jurisprudence that reflect theories about market efficiency.
This Part also considers judicial responses to multinational class actions, identifying certain assumptions that courts make about the
regulatory interests at stake in multinational cases. Part V assesses
whether courts operating within the current jurisdictional framework
can adequately manage foreign-cubed claims and the regulatory conflicts they present. The Article concludes that, at present, they cannot, lending support to proposals for a jurisdictional limit based on
the location of investment transactions.

II.

SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES

LAW
Securities claims based on transactions with foreign elements
present difficult questions of subject-matter jurisdiction--difficult
because the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws do not
5. See infra Part III.B for a description of this data set.
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speak directly to the scope of their application in the international
context. Certain anti-fraud provisions contain inherent limitations on
their reach. The express remedies provided in the Securities Act of
1933, for example, are limited to misstatements or omissions in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and therefore do
not apply to foreign-market transactions. 6 The central anti-fraud provision, however, Rule lOb-5, contains no such limitation: it applies to
any transaction in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.7
The rule does contain a basic "jurisdictional means" requirement in
that it applies only to fraud committed "by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange." 8 Because this requirement is met whenever U.S. mail or phone service is used, however,
the jurisdictional means is present in virtually every case involving
some contact with the United States. The question therefore remains
how to limit the application of U.S. law in cross-border cases.
It is broadly accepted that Congress expected U.S. securities
laws to apply to certain international transactions or conduct. 9 Pre6. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000) (applying to misstatements
or omissions contained in a registration statement filed with the SEC); Securities Act of
1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2000) (applying to misstatements or omissions in connection with an offering made by means of a U.S. prospectus, as interpreted in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995)).
7. Rule 10b-5, adopted pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, provides in its entirety as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2007).
8. Id. "Means of interstate commerce" refers to the phone or wire systems in the
United States. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(17), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2000)
("The term 'interstate commerce' means trade, commerce, transportation, or communication
among the several States, or between any foreign country and any State ....The term also
includes intrastate use of (A) any facility of a national securities exchange or of a telephone
or other interstate means of communication ....
").
9. Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act, for instance, states that a person engaged in a
business in securities outside the United States may be exempted from regulation "unless he
transacts such business in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this title." 15 U.S.C. §
78dd (2000). Courts have inferred from this provision that "the [Exchange] Act was meant
to apply to those foreign transactions not specifically exempted." Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968). Cf Margaret V. Sachs, The InternationalReach of
Rule lOb-5: The Myth of CongressionalSilence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677 (1990)
(arguing that the legislative history suggests Congress intended the anti-fraud provisions to
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cisely which transactions or conduct are covered remains a matter of
judicial interpretation. As the Second Circuit summarized in an early
case, "when ... a court is confronted with transactions that on any
view are predominantly foreign, it must seek to determine whether
Congress would have wished the precious resources of United States
courts and law enforcement agencies to be 10devoted to them rather
than leave the problem to foreign countries."
Legislative jurisdiction over cross-border securities claims
rests on two alternative bases: conduct occurring within the United
States, and effects within the United States of conduct taking place
abroad. 11 Over the past several decades, federal courts have developed and refined tests that establish the parameters of jurisdiction on
these bases. The Supreme Court has never spoken on the issue, however, 12 and, as one court recently put it, "a substantial degree of doctrinal ambiguity and division [exists] in the governing
legal rules and
13
precedents" addressing subject-matter jurisdiction.
The following sections set out the tests for establishing subject-matter jurisdiction over claims with foreign elements. My goal
is not a comprehensive treatment of this subject, as the historical development of these tests and their numerous variations have been
amply analyzed elsewhere. 14 Rather, I aim to sketch the tests only in
sufficient detail to identify (1) how courts have framed the policy inapply to domestic trading only).
10. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975).
11. This approach is consistent with the jurisdictional analysis used in other substantive areas. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 401403, 416 (1987); Russell J. Weintraub, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEX. L. REv.
1799 (1992).
12. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518 n.12 (1974) (setting aside the
question of scope in securities law as not presented by that case). But see id. at 529-30 ("It
has been recognized that the 1934 Act, including the protections of Rule 1Ob-5, applies when
foreign defendants have defrauded American investors, particularly when, as alleged here,
they have profited by virtue of proscribed conduct within our boundaries.").
13. In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
14. See Sachs, supra note 9. See also Kun Young Chang, MultinationalEnforcement
of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89 (2004); Stephen J. Choi &
Andrew T. Guzman, The DangerousExtraterritorialityofAmerican SecuritiesLaw, 17 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & BuS. 207 (1997); Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 523 (1993); Michael W. Gordon, United
States ExtraterritorialSubject MatterJurisdiction in Securities FraudLitigation, 10 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 487 (1996); Roberta S. Karmel, The Second Circuit's Role in Expanding the SEC's
JurisdictionAbroad, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 743 (1991); Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum
Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud Protection in an InternationalizedSecurities
Marketplace, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (1992); Gregory K. Matson, Note, Restrict-

ing the Jurisdictionof American Courts over TransnationalSecurities Fraud, 79 GEO. L. J.
141 (199 1); W. Barton Patterson, Note, Defining the Reach of the Securities Exchange Act:
ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antifraud Provisions,74 FORDHAM L. REV. 213 (2006).
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terests they see emerging in foreign as opposed to domestic transactions, and (2) the specific obstacles these tests create for claimants in
multinational class actions. Readers familiar with jurisdictional
analysis under the securities laws may wish to proceed directly to
Part III.
A.

JurisdictionBased on Effects within the United States

Jurisdiction on the basis of effects involves the extraterritorial
application of domestic securities law, as, by definition, the conduct
in question occurs in another country. As in other areas of law,
courts interpreting securities law assume that "Congress is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions," 15 and therefore recognize a
general presumption against the application of U.S. law to foreign
conduct.16 However, the presumption against extraterritoriality can
be overcome by a finding that Congress intended the legislation in
question to reach foreign conduct or transactions. In securities cases,
courts have frequently held that the strength of the legislative interest
in protecting U.S. investors and markets is sufficient to justify the
of foreign conduct that causes effects within the United
regulation
17
States.
The effects test was first fully articulated in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,18 a derivative action brought by a U.S. shareholder of a
Canadian corporation. The complaint alleged that in a transaction
taking place in Canada, the corporation had sold its treasury stock at
a price artificially depressed by the non-disclosure of relevant inside
information, thereby reducing shareholder equity and diminishing the
value of the company's securities on the U.S. market. 19 The court
held that even isolated foreign transactions could be subject to the
application of U.S. securities law, noting their potential to affect adversely the interests of U.S. investors. In its view, "Congress in15. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
16. The presumption against extraterritoriality stems from a number of foreign-policy
and related concerns. See generally EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244
(1991); Gary B. Born, A Reappraisalof the ExtraterritorialReach of US. Law, 24 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1993); William S. Dodge, Understandingthe Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85 (1998); Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome":
Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,84 Nw. U. L.
REV. 598 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Sloane Overseas Fund, Ltd. v. Sapiens Int'l Corp., 941 F. Supp. 1369,
1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that the Aramco case, and thus the presumption against extraterritoriality, has "never been applied" to securities claims in the Second Circuit).
18. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), overruled on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968).
19. Id. at 204-08.
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tended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order
to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities
on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market
from 20
the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities."
The opinion takes an expansive view of the policy underlying
the Exchange Act. It characterizes the goal of the Act not only as
protecting the fairness of U.S. markets-in the sense of regulating the
conditions under which transactions on U.S. exchanges take place-21
but also more generally as protecting the interests of U.S. investors.
In a sense, among securities cases with foreign elements, the effects
cases present a particularly clear policy rationale for U.S. regulation:
the need to protect U.S. investors from securities fraud that directly
affects their financial interests. The court in Schoenbaum itself attached significant weight to the fact that the securities in question
were listed and traded on a U.S. market. This seems to have been a
way of emphasizing the magnitude of the U.S. interest, 22 and therefore suggests a narrow scope of application for the effects test. Simply by going beyond U.S. transactions, however, the decision set the
stage for expansive application of U.S. law. Indeed, later cases applied the test more broadly, finding that legislative jurisdiction could
be established over claims based on transactions in non-U.S. listed
securities as well.
The primary limitation that has emerged on the reach of effects-based jurisdiction is that the claimant must show detrimental effect on specific interests within the United States.23 Courts have consistently rejected arguments that U.S. securities law reaches foreign
conduct simply because that conduct affects general confidence in
the U.S. securities markets. As one court stated, "The anti-fraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws would then be used to address general market conditions rather than redress specific harms suffered by
some U.S.-interested party, a goal specifically foreclosed by numer20. Id. at 206.
21. In one passage of its opinion, the court cites Section 2 of the Exchange Act, which
has a clear focus on transactions, but then turns to the interests of investors more generally.
See id. at 206 (arguing that Congress would not have intended "to preclude application of the
Exchange Act to transactions regarding stocks traded in the United States which are effected
outside the United States, when extraterritorial application of the Act is necessary to protect
American investors;" the Act "seeks to regulate the stock exchanges and the relationshipsof
the investingpublic to corporations which [list] on such exchanges" (emphasis added)).
22. Id. at 208 ("at least when the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a
national securities exchange").
23. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
that "an adverse effect on this country's general economic interests or on American security
prices" was insufficient to establish jurisdiction).
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ous interpretations of the securities laws." 24 Thus, generalized effects of foreign conduct on U.S. markets or the U.S. economy are insufficient as a jurisdictional basis.
B.

JurisdictionBased on Conduct within the United States

The conduct test was developed to assess legislative jurisdiction over transactions that, although predominantly foreign, involve a
certain amount of fraudulent conduct within the United States. The
first case articulating the conduct test, Leasco v. Maxwell,25 focused
on the policy at the heart of the securities laws: protecting the interests of U.S. investors. The case involved allegations that the defendants had engaged in fraudulent misrepresentations within the United
States in order to induce the U.S. plaintiffs purchase of securities in
London. 26 Those securities were not listed or traded in the United
States, thereby, in the court's view, distinguishing the situation from
that in Schoenbaum and rendering the effects test inapplicable. 27 In
holding that the U.S.-based conduct was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, the court emphasized the policy of protecting U.S. interests:
"Still we must ask ourselves whether, if Congress had thought about
the point, it would not have wished to protect an American investor if
a foreigner comes to the United States and fraudulently induces him
to purchase foreign securities
abroad-a purpose which its words can
28
fairly be held to embrace."
Had it remained limited to this factual setting, the conduct test
would be quite narrow, and would remain linked to precisely the
same policy as the effects test (protecting the interests of U.S. investors, though not necessarily limited to interests acquired in U.S.
transactions). Later courts, however, interpreted the conduct test to
confer jurisdiction over transactions that did not affect U.S. investors
at all. In a case decided only three years after Leasco, the Second
Circuit considered a case brought by a Luxembourg investment trust
that had very few American investors.29 The fund alleged that a foreign defendant had committed fraud in connection with a complicated series of investment transactions, at least some aspects of
which had unfolded within the United States. In that case, the court
24. Interbrew S.A. v. Edperbrascan Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
25. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
26. Id. at 1331.
27. Id. at 1334.
28. See id. at 1337 (distinguishing the situation in which two foreign parties are injured
by conduct occurring in the United States).
29. IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that American
fundholders made up only .2% of the total).
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concluded that U.S. investors had felt no substantial effects. 30 It
nevertheless held that the conduct test conferred jurisdiction, articulating an entirely different policy rationale to justify the application
of U.S. law to the fraudulent conduct: "We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners." 31 As applied to claims brought by foreign
claimants on the basis of non-U.S. transactions then, the conduct test
protects not the core policy of protecting U.S. investors and markets,
but the subsidiary policy of preventing the United States from becoming 2 a "launching pad" for fraudulent behavior directed elsewherei
Although conduct within the United States-at least significant conduct-is traditionally recognized as an acceptable basis of
legislative jurisdiction, 33 this expanded version of the conduct test
may reach conduct that affects neither U.S. market conditions nor the
financial interests of U.S. investors. In other words, the "launching
pad" concern is present whether or not the interests of U.S. investors
are directly implicated. 34 It therefore enables the type of claim here
considered-in which a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign defendant for
damages arising out of a foreign transaction, on the grounds that substantial conduct connected with that transaction occurred within the
United States.
This expansive interpretation of the conduct test has led to
considerable fragmentation and complexity in subject-matter jurisdiction jurisprudence. Some courts have embraced Leasco's implication
that U.S.-based conduct creates a basis of jurisdiction completely independent of effects on U.S. interests. 35 Others, in cases in which
30. Id. at 1016-17.
31. Id. at 1017.
32. These cases indirectly protect U.S. interests by encouraging reciprocity in the policies of our trading partners. "This country would surely look askance if one of our
neighbors stood by silently and permitted misrepresented securities to be poured into the
United States. By the same token it is hard to believe Congress meant to prohibit the SEC
from policing similar activities within this country .... " Id. See also SEC v. Kasser, 548
F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977) (outlining three policies for extending jurisdiction even over
claims that cause no effect on U.S. markets or to U.S. investors: (1) preventing the United
States from becoming a base of operations for fraudulent conduct; (2) promoting reciprocal
enforcement by other countries where fraud is directed toward the United States; and (3) furthering the policy of maintaining high standards of conduct in securities transactions within
the United States).
33. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(a) (1987).
34. See lIT, 519 F.2d at 1018 (recognizing this extension of the conduct test).
35. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Cable
& Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 764 (E.D. Va. 2004) (conceding that the
fraud in question "did not effect [sic] a great deal of Americans nor did they impact American markets," but concluding nevertheless that "defendants' domestic conduct alone gives
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U.S. interests are not directly affected, seek some additional connection to the United States. 36 Over the years, the different circuits have
developed competing standards for evaluating the kind or quantity of
local conduct that is necessary to create jurisdiction over predominantly foreign transactions. Under the standard most frequently invoked, a court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over securities
claims if "(a) there was conduct in the United States that directly
caused the [claimant's] losses and (b) such conduct was more37than
'merely preparatory' to a securities fraud conducted elsewhere."
C.

JurisdictionBased on the Combination of Conduct and
Effects

In one case, the Second Circuit suggested that rather than inspect effects and conduct separately, courts should engage in a more
holistic analysis. 38 Such an approach might be used to expand the
reach of U.S. law, since courts could view the jurisdictional test as
satisfied by a combination of conduct and effects that standing alone
would not be sufficient. 39 However, it might also be used to narrow
the scope of subject-matter jurisdiction, as courts could interpret it to
require that at least some level of both conduct and effects be established in order to justify the application of U.S. law. In a similar
vein, some decisions have gone beyond application of the conduct
and effects tests to look for additional "tipping factors" that would
favor jurisdiction in cases with predominantly foreign elements. 40 In
this Court subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign purchaser Plaintiffs' claims.").
36. See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that the conduct test is separate and meant to be so); Ohman v. Kahn, 685 F. Supp. 1302,
1306 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that the cumulative effect of alleged preparatory activities was
sufficient to invoke U.S. securities law).
37. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571, 2004 WL 2375830,
at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2004). This version is based on the Second Circuit's articulation.
For an account of the importance of that court-and, in particular, of Judge Friendly-in
shaping extraterritoriality jurisprudence, see Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law
of Securities Regulation: The Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REv. 777
(1997) and Karmel, supra note 14.
38. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) ("There is no requirement that [the conduct and effects] tests be applied separately and distinctly from each
other. Indeed, an admixture or combination of the two often gives a better picture of
whether there is sufficient United States involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by
an American court.").
39. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 531-32 (suggesting that, under the blended approach, jurisdictional contacts independently insufficient to satisfy either test could be combined).
40. Interbrew S.A. v. Edperbrascan Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (in
simple securities litigation, noting fraudulent filings on which the foreign plaintiff might
have relied, but then seeking additional connecting factors). See also Europe & Overseas
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general, the cases that deviate from the strict conduct-effects dichotomy reflect judicial unease with the application of domestic securities law in cases with strong connections to other jurisdictions.
III.

SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION IN MULTINATIONAL CLASS
ACTIONS

This Part turns to the application of jurisdictional rules in the
particular context of multinational class actions. It begins by discussing litigation procedure in class actions under federal securities laws,
considering the different points at which parties may challenge subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign-based claims. It then examines
the disposition of multinational class actions, looking at the different
tools that courts use to address foreign-cubed claims.
A.

Securities Class Action Procedureand the Points of
JurisdictionalChallenge

Securities class actions in U.S. federal courts are conducted
pursuant to the procedural framework laid out in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). 4 1 The PSLRA was enacted in
1995 in order to address perceived abuses in group securities litigation.42 Critics were particularly concerned that plaintiffs' attorneys,
rather than plaintiffs themselves, were managing class actions, with
the frequent result that case outcomes enriched the attorneys rather
than providing meaningful compensation to the plaintiff class. With
the aim of discouraging frivolous litigation, the statute introduced
some amendments to the substantive elements of securities claimsfor instance, it imposed heightened pleading requirements, 43 created

Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1998);
AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P'ship, 740 F.2d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 1984); Fidenas AG
v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5, 910 (2d Cir. 1979).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2000).
42.

See 7 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22:2

(4th ed. 2002) (recounting the Act's legislative history); Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on
Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1465, 1469 (2004) (discussing the goals of the
PSLRA). See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978) (recognizing
the possibility that "[c]ertification of a large class may so increase the defendant's potential
damages liability and litigation costs that he may find it economically prudent to settle and
to abandon a meritorious defense").
43. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)(2) (2000).
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safe harbors for some categories of forward-looking statements, 44
and eliminated certain types of derivative liability for securities violations. 45 It also addressed class action procedure. The PSLRA did
not disturb the basic structure established by Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: to be certified as a class action, a securities
claim must therefore meet the usual requirements of numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy. 46 However, the PSLRA
did
47
adopt a new process for selecting the representative plaintiff.
Prior to the PSLRA, as in class action process generally, the
plaintiff who first filed a claim was the presumptive class representative. This meant that a drop in a company's securities price could set
off a race to the courthouse among potential plaintiffs, with the risk
that the class would be represented by small investors easily manipulated by class counsel. 48 The Act eliminated the first-to-file rule. It
requires a plaintiff filing a securities claim on behalf of a putative
class to publish notice of that action, providing other shareholders the
opportunity to seek appointment as lead plaintiff.49 Following the
end of the notice period, the court must then consider the applications
of any investors-whether they filed their own actions or not-who
move for that appointment. 50 The statute instructs the court to appoint the party who will most adequately represent the interests of the
class, and creates a presumption that the most 51
adequate plaintiff is the
one with the largest financial interest at stake.

44. See id. § 21E.
45. See id. § 21D(f).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Plaintiffs must also establish that their claim falls within one
of the Rule 23(b) categories. On the interaction between the Federal Rules' class action
process and the PSLRA, see generally Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 1376-92 (5th ed. 2004).
47. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
InstitutionalInvestors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053, 2105-07 (1995) (setting forth the proposal eventually enacted in the PSLRA); Jill E.
Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 533, 53437 (1997) (discussing the adoption of the lead plaintiff provision and the purposes it was intended to serve).
48. See Fisch, supra note 47, at 535-39 (describing the "abuse scenario" painted by
legislators as including the danger that small shareholders (a) had little financial incentive at
stake in the case and therefore (i) little reason carefully to monitor class counsel and (ii) little
reason to resist a premature settlement; and (b) tended to be unsophisticated and therefore
unable to monitor the litigation effectively). See also Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 47.
49. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)
(2000).
50. See id. § 21 D(a)(3)(B). The court is expected to consider such motions and make
the appointment within 90 days, although in many cases the process is extended when investors challenge each other's motions for appointment.
51. See id. § 21D(a)(3)(B)(iii). Either an individual plaintiff or a group can be appointed lead. The lead plaintiff also selects, subject to court approval, class counsel. See id.
§ 21 D(a)(3)(B)(v).
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Over the course of securities class action litigation, jurisdictional questions may arise at a number of different points. Some are
implicated only by the particular procedural steps involved in class
actions, but others are presented in individual as well as group litigation.
1.

Selection of Lead Plaintiff

As discussed above, the individual plaintiff or plaintiff group
with the largest financial interest at stake-and that otherwise meets
the requirements of Rule 23-is presumed to be lead plaintiff. That
presumption can be rebutted by a showing that the presumptive lead
plaintiff would not "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class," or would face unique defenses not implicated by the claims of
other class members. 52 In recognizing these grounds for challenging
the presumptive status of a lead plaintiff, the PSLRA responds to the
concerns incorporated in the typicality and adequacy requirements of
Rule 23(a). In many securities cases, foreign investors have sought
appointment as lead plaintiff. Other potential lead plaintiffs often
contest their motions for appointment, requiring the courts to consider whether a movant's foreign status is relevant to its ability to
serve as lead.53
One factor courts have considered in this regard, related only
tangentially to jurisdiction, is the logistical complexity that may arise
when a lead plaintiff is foreign. This factor is not linked to the location of the transactions giving rise to the potential lead plaintiff's
claim; it is merely a question of a foreign resident's ability to manage
adequately litigation occurring in the United States. Those challenging foreign plaintiffs on this basis argue that they would provide inadequate representation due to differences in language and legal sysissues
Courts have generally found such logistical
tems.
54
surmountable, disposing relatively quickly of this concern.
A second factor courts address when they consider appointing
foreign investors as lead plaintiffs presents jurisdictional questions
52. See id. § 21 D(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).
53. This is often the first point during securities litigation at which the court is asked to
rule on a motion that raises jurisdictional issues.
54. See, e.g., In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001)
(approving as lead plaintiff a group of three foreign individuals); Takeda v. Turbodyne
Techs., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Cf In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 271
F. Supp. 2d 3, 13 (D.D.C. 2002) (stating that a single foreign individual as lead plaintiff was
undesirable partly due to "geographic and linguistic barriers"); In re Network Assocs., Inc.
Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (rejecting two foreign institutions
proposed as lead plaintiffs partly on the basis that their distance and differences in business
culture would prevent them from adequately managing group litigation in California).
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more directly. In cases in which the proposed lead plaintiffs claims
arise from foreign-market transactions rather than U.S.-market transactions, they have been challenged on the grounds that their claims
would be subject to unique defenses, such as lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction andforum non conveniens. Courts are mixed in their responses to this question. Some have at this initial stage been willing
to go forward despite potential challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction later in the litigation. 55 Others, conscious of the difficulties that
would result if a foreign investor were appointed sole lead plaintiff
only to have its claims later dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, have chosen to override the presumption in favor of a
U.S.-based claimant. 56 Several courts have adopted an intermediate
approach, approving the use of co-lead plaintiffs in multinational
class actions--one plaintiff (or group) whose transaction arose out of
a foreign investment, and one whose claim was based on a U.S. market transaction. 57 These courts have suggested that the appointment
of co-leads would recognize the stake of foreign claimants in the litigation, while ensuring that the specific concerns raised by claims
based on foreign transactions did not shift the focus of litigation
away58from the common issues of law and fact at the base of the action.
2.

Certification of the Class

Class certification is governed not by the PSLRA but by the
ordinary process set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
55. See, e.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 510-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 01-CV-1855(RMB), 2002 WL 1492116
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2002) (order appointing Canadian institution as sole lead plaintiff).
56. See, e.g., In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 343, 352 (D. Md. 2003)
(rebutting the presumption in favor of a foreign institutional investor on the grounds that it
would not be able to avoid devoting a substantial portion of its efforts to defending against
jurisdictional attacks, and noting that its claims might be dismissed at the certification stage).
57. See In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 217 F.R.D. 372, 378 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(appointing a Canadian institutional investor and a U.S. individual investor as co-lead plaintiffs for a putative class including purchasers of common stock traded on the London Stock
Exchange as well as ADSs traded on the New York Stock Exchange).
58. See generally CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 42, § 22:4. Courts have recognized
the utility of co-lead plaintiffs in enhancing class representation outside the context of jurisdiction as well. Some, for example, have held that the combination of an institutional and
individual investor could help assure the best representation possible of all claims within a
class. See In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(limiting a proposed 30-member group to three co-lead plaintiffs: "Allowing for diverse
representation, including in this case a state pension fund, significant individual investors
and a large institutional investor, ensures that the interests of all class members will be adequately represented in the prosecution of the action and in the negotiation and approval of a
fair settlement, and that the settlement process will not be distorted by the differing aims of
differently situated claimants.").
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When the lead plaintiff moves for certification of the plaintiff class, it
must therefore meet the general Rule 23(a) requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation.5 9 In addition, it must show that the action falls within one of the Rule 23(b)
categories. 60 Plaintiffs in securities class actions generally proceed
under Rule 23(b)(3), under which they must establish that questions
of law or fact common to the class members predominate over questions that affect only individual class members, and that the class action is superior to any other method of adjudicating the controversy.
Certain Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) elements present obstacles to the
certification of multinational classes.
a.

Typicality under Rule 23(a)

To satisfy the typicality requirement, the plaintiffs must establish that the interests of the class representatives are shared by
group members. 6 1 Even if the claims of representatives and other
class members arise out of the same set of events (for instance, a single instance of fraudulent misrepresentation that affects an issuer's
securities prices on multiple markets), typicality may be absent if the
claims depend on different legal arguments. This can become an issue in multinational class actions if courts believe that different legal
standards apply to domestic-based claims and claims made by foreign investors. To take an example that is discussed in further detail
below, 62 a court might exclude foreign claimants for lack of typicality if it found that they, unlike U.S. claimants, were not entitled to
use the fraud on
the market theory to satisfy the reliance requirement
63
of Rule lOb-5.

59. Rule 23(a) states the following prerequisites to a class action: "(1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
60. Rule 23(b) sets forth the conditions under which an action that meets the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) may be maintained. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
61.

See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 42, § 22:24.

62. See discussion infra Part IV.B. L.a.
63. See, e.g., Smith v. Dominion Bridge Corp., No. Civ. A. 96-7580, 1998 WL 98998,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 1998) (finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish typicality for
this reason). A similar issue is sometimes raised in connection with pendent state law claims
in federal litigation. Defendants have argued that because presumptive reliance is unavailable under state law, those claims cannot be appended to federal claims without defeating
the predominance requirement. Courts have rejected such objections. See CONTE &
NEWBERG, supra note 42, § 22:63.
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b.

Predominanceof Common Issues under Rule 23(b)

The Rule 23(b) requirement that common issues predominate,
while it overlaps with the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement, is
applied more rigorously. 64 Plaintiffs must establish not only the existence of common questions of law or fact, but that such questions are
not overwhelmed by questions particular to certain class members.
Here, again, the causation elements of a Rule 1Ob-5 cause of action
present potential difficulty, as a court might require individualized
rather than class-wide proof of reliance if it finds the fraud on the
market theory to be unavailable to foreign claimants. Some defendants therefore challenge the suitability of multinational classes on
the basis of this requirement.
c.

Superiority under Rule 23(b)

The primary jurisdictional question arising from Rule 23(b)
relates to the superiority requirement, and centers on the preclusive
effect of any judgment or settlement reached in a class action. This
concern has two components. The first is that a successful plaintiff
might not be able to enforce a judgment against assets of a defendant
located abroad; the second is that a judgment or settlement reached in
a U.S. court might lack preclusive effect in other countries, permitting unsuccessful plaintiffs to relitigate in a foreign court. The first
issue is largely unproblematic, as the defendants in multinational actions generally have assets in the United States sufficient to satisfy
any judgment there.65 The second, however, presents a real obstacle
to the certification of classes including foreign claimants.
Preclusive effect is the centerpiece of a viable group litigation
mechanism. A class action defendant must be able to enter into a settlement, or proceed to judgment, with the assurance that members of
the plaintiff class will not later be able to lodge the same claims again
in another forum. 66 Class actions involving only U.S. plaintiffs provide this assurance. The Supreme Court has held that a court in one
state may bind absent class members-even if they have no contacts
64. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
("The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry 'is a more demanding criterion than the commonality inquiry under Rule 23(a)."' (quoting Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 1247,
1252 (2d Cir. 2002))).
65. See In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 509, 547 n.8
(D.N.J. 2005).
66. See generally 5 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS

§ 16 (4th ed. 2002).
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with that state-as long as they are afforded "minimal procedural due
process protection." 67 Adequate notice and an opportunity to opt out
satisfy those minimal requirements. 68 Once a U.S. court approves a
settlement or enters judgment, courts in other U.S. states will grant its
action preclusive effect in accordance with the Constitutional full
faith and credit guarantee. In class actions involving foreign plaintiffs, however, the situation is different. While a U.S. court may conclude that the absent (foreign) class members have been afforded due
process, it cannot guarantee the subsequent recognition of its decision
by a foreign court.
Countries differ in their approach to recognizing and enforc69
ing foreign judgments, including the judgments of U.S. courts.
Virtually all countries, however, reserve the right to refuse enforcement of judgments that violate local public policy. 70 It is in this regard that class-action settlements and judgments present particular
problems. Most foreign legal systems do not permit group litigation,
and even those that have adopted some form of collective action
71
mechanism do not recognize the validity of opt-out procedures.
The opt-out procedure relies on the theory of constructive notice, but
other systems start from the principle that absent class members who
have not had actual notice of the litigation, and who did not participate in that litigation, cannot be bound by its outcome. 72 It is therefore possible that courts in one or more foreign systems would refuse
to recognize a U.S. class action settlement or judgment, creating the
risk that a defendant would face further litigation in a country in

67. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (applying this
analysis to foreign as well as U.S. plaintiffs).
68. Id. at 812 (discussing "notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the
litigation," and the "opportunity [for the plaintiffl to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an 'opt-out' or 'request for exclusion' form to the court").
69. The failed negotiations surrounding the proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments highlighted many of these differences. See generally SymposiumEnforcing Judgments Abroad: The Global Challenge, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998).
70. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
942-43 (Kluwer Law Int'l 3d ed. 1996) (1988) (discussing the approach to recognition of
foreign judgments in Germany, Japan, and England).
71. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Implied "Consent" to Personal Jurisdiction in Transnational Class Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 619, 624-25 (2004) (noting that the U.S.
class action device is "unique," and citing authorities describing the more limited versions of
group litigation mechanisms adopted elsewhere); Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and
Group Litigation in Switzerland, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 301, 310-11 (2007) (discussing
the rejection of U.S.-style class action procedures in Switzerland).
72. See e.g., In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., Declaration of Rolf Stiirner, 294 F.
Supp. 2d 616 (D. Del. 2003) (No. 00-993/00-984/01-004-JJF), 2003 WL 24337540 (concluding that in various countries procedural law would require individual notice to class
members in a manner inconsistent with the procedures followed under current class action
practice in the United States).
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which transactions in its securities had taken place. 73 U.S. courts
hearing securities claims have long noted this risk. In one early case,
the Second Circuit recognized the unfairness to the defendant that
would result if plaintiff class members were not bound, and on that
basis excluded foreign plaintiffs from the class: "[The question of
preclusive effect] must be considered not simply in the halcyon context of a large recovery which plaintiff visualizes but in those of a
judgment for the defendants or a plaintiffs' judgment or a settlement
deemed to be inadequate .... If defendants prevail against a class
entitled to a victory no less broad than a defeat would have
they are
74
been."
Courts are divided on the question whether uncertainty regarding claim preclusion should bar the certification of multinational
classes. Some recognize the theoretical possibility of subsequent litigation abroad, but reject it as unlikely due to a variety of practical
concerns. 75 First, the likelihood that plaintiffs in a U.S. class action
would relitigate elsewhere may as a practical matter exist only in jurisdictions that themselves have group litigation mechanisms. In
other systems, the economic impracticability of bringing small claims
individually renders relitigation unlikely. 7 o Second, the substantive
securities law of foreign jurisdictions may discourage effective group
litigation. In many countries, for instance, plaintiffs receive no presumption of reliance, and the need to establish individualized reliance
therefore makes group action unwieldy. On these bases, courts
sometimes find that the prospect of relitigation is simply too remote
to worry about preclusion, and conclude77that a U.S. class action remains a superior method of adjudication.
73. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76, 95-105 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (providing a full exploration of these issues under the laws of Austria, England,
France, Germany, and the Netherlands).
74. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Janet
Walker, CrossborderClass Actions: A View From Across the Border, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 755, 764 (2004).
75. See, e.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 48-49 (S.D. Cal. 1975)
(noting that because meaningful discovery was unavailable in other systems, it would be
nearly impossible for plaintiffs to mount a successful case in other jurisdictions, and that the
defendant was not doing business in other countries and thus would not be amenable to suit
there); id. at 53 (stating that the res judicata concern is more compelling when plaintiffs have
in fact already filed claims elsewhere).
76. As some commentators have noted, this concern may actually have greater force in
other areas of the law, where the claims being aggregated are individually small. In securities class actions, however, there are often individual plaintiffs with quite substantial stakes.
It may therefore be difficult to conclude ex ante that relitigation even in jurisdictions without
class action procedures is unlikely.
77. Some cases have also noted that the inclusion of a named foreign plaintiff may, in
the case of a foreign system that uses class actions, allow the U.S. court to assert jurisdiction
over the absent foreign class members. See Krangel v. Golden Rule Resources, Ltd., 194
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These questions about the likelihood of relitigation abroad are
often addressed through a battle of experts as to whether the foreign
systems in question would in fact grant preclusive effect to a settlement or judgment reached in a U.S. court. Decisions reflect a variety
of responses to the "maybes" that such battles inevitably produce.
Some courts will dismiss foreign claims on this basis only if they are
convinced of the "near certainty" that a settlement or judgment would
not be recognized in the relevant foreign system. 78 A few have gone
even further, refusing to order a dismissal as long as there is some
possibility of recognition in the relevant foreign country. 79 Other
courts, however, have voiced more concern, defining classes to exclude foreign plaintiffs. 80 In its recent decision in the Vivendi litigation, the Southern District of New York adopted a sliding-scale approach: "The closer the likelihood of non-recognition is to being a
'near certainty,' the more appropriate it is for the Court to deny certi81
fication of foreign claimants."
3.

Motions to Dismiss Under 12(b)(1)

Defendants frequently attack the question of subject-matter
jurisdiction directly, moving to dismiss claims based on foreign investment transactions. Such motions are often part of omnibus motions to dismiss following the filing of the complaint. In addition,
courts may consider the presence of subject-matter jurisdiction sua
sponte.82 In some cases with cross-border elements, courts have at
various stages in the litigation simply asked the parties to brief the isF.R.D. 501, 506 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
78. In a case considering whether foreign shareholders would be required to opt in, or
could be included in the opt-out process, the court stated that "[b]ecause defendant has not
borne its burden of demonstrating a substantialprobability of subsequent foreign suits and
consequent enforcement of adverse judgments against assets held abroad, we decline to depart from the traditional opt out class action format." Jordan v. Global Natural Resources,
Inc., 104 F.R.D. 447, 448 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (emphasis added). See also In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 766 (E.D. Va. 2004) (characterizing res judicata concerns as
a mere possibility and therefore unproblematic in the context of a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction). Accord In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. Litig., 380 F.
Supp. 2d 509, 547 (D.N.J. 2005).
79. See, e.g., In re Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetler, A.S. Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 353, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("The case law suggests that, if there is some possibility that a class action
judgment would be enforceable--or at least have some substantial effect-in the foreign jurisdiction at issue, then class certification is proper.").
80. See, e.g., CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 127 F.R.D. 454, 455
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying certification to a class of British investors on the basis, among
other reasons, of res judicata concerns).
81. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
82. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) provides that "[w]henever it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter,
the court shall dismiss the action."
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83
sue, and then followed with jurisdictional rulings.

4.

Motions to Dismiss on the Basis of Forum Non Conveniens or
Comity

a.

Forum Non Conveniens

In a number of early cases, courts held that claims brought
under U.S. regulatory law were not subject to dismissal on the basis
of forum non conveniens.84 They based these holdings on the special
venue provisions incorporated in those laws, 85 which in their view
signaled Congressional belief that the use of U.S. judicial fora was
mandatory in regulatory cases. In recent years, however, courts have
departed from this analysis and held that forum non conveniens is a
proper ground to dismiss claims brought under federal regulatory
law, including securities law. 86 Because multinational class actions
involve substantial contacts
with foreign jurisdictions, they are often
87
motions.
such
with
met
In order to obtain a dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens, the defendant must first show that an adequate forum is
available elsewhere. 88 It must then establish that the balance of rele83. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1330
(2d Cir. 1972).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573 (1948) (holding that
the venue provision of the Clayton Act eliminated judicial discretion to dismiss antitrust
claims on the basis offorum non conveniens).
85. See Securities Act of 1933 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C § 77v (2000); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000) (venue in securities cases).
86. See Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 945 (1st Cir. 1991) (rejecting the
traditional view and finding securities claims susceptible of forum non conveniens dismissal); Alfadda v. Fenn, 966 F. Supp. 1317, 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dismissing claims in a
U.S. court because France proved more convenient). See also Fustok v. Banque Populaire
Suisse, 546 F. Supp. 506, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (reaching the same conclusion in a case
applying the Commodities Exchange Act). This relaxation of the traditional view is consistent with the move to enforce forum foreign-selection and governing-law clauses in private
securities agreements. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Regulatory Policy in TransnationalLitigation: The Influence of JudicialGlobalization, in 1 FESTSCHRIFT FOR ERIK JAYME 73 (HeinzPeter Mansel et al. eds., 2004).
87. This may become a more important alternative in light of the Supreme Court's recent holding that courts may dismiss claims on the basis of forum non conveniens without
first establishing personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims. Sinochem Int'l
Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2007). In multinational
class actions presenting particularly difficult jurisdictional issues, courts may view forum
non conveniens as a more straightforward route to dismissal. See id. at 1194 ("[W]here subject-matter or personal jurisdiction is difficult to determine, andforum non conveniens considerations weigh heavily in favor of dismissal, the court properly takes the less burdensome
course.").
88. This generally means that the defendant must be subject to service of process in an
identified foreign forum, and that forum must permit litigation of the subject matter. See
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vant private- and public-interest factors implicated in the litigation
weighs strongly in favor of dismissal. 89 Both of these steps implicate
jurisdictional questions in multinational class actions.
i.

Adequate Available Forum

A foreign forum will generally be deemed adequate if the subject-matter of the claim in question can be litigated there. 9° As the
Supreme Court has made clear, simply demonstrating that the substantive law to be applied in the foreign forum is different from the
law that would be applied by the U.S. court--even different in ways
that would make the plaintiffs claim substantially less likely to succeed-is not alone enough to defeat a motion to dismiss. 91 Similarly,
differences in procedural law do not generally preclude dismissal:
thus, courts have often held that the absence of broad pre-trial discovery, or of the right to trial by jury, is not alone enough to defeat a
motion to dismiss." However, substantive or procedural differences
may be so substantial that they would essentially prevent the plaintiff
from asserting its claim in the foreign forum at all. In such a case,
the forum may properly be found inadequate.
Courts considering motions to dismiss securities claims are
not generally troubled by differences between U.S. and foreign law
as long as they share basic substantive features. If applicable foreign
law provides a remedy for fraud, the foreign forum may be seen as
adequate even if the specific elements of the claim, or the precise
remedy available, differ from their U.S. counterparts.93 Class actions, however, rely on two features of U.S. law whose absence in
foreign systems raises particular concern. First, class action plaintiffs
in U.S. court need generally not establish individual reliance; rather,
94
reliance is presumed on the basis of the fraud on the market theory.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981).
89. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (outlining the relevant
interests).
90. See generally BORN, supra note 70, at 351-52.
91. Piper, 454 U.S. at 247. See also Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 158 F. Supp. 2d 347,
353 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding Bermuda to be an adequate available forum).
92. See BORN, supra note 70, at 353 (concluding that "U.S. courts are generally reluctant to deny dismissal merely because foreign procedures differ from those in the United
States").
93. See Howe v. Goldcorp Invs. Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 952 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that the
foreign law "offer[s] shareholders somewhat similar protections by forbidding misrepresentation and fraud and imposing fiduciary obligations," and affirming dismissal of the action in
favor of Canadian court); In re Corel Corp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 363, 365 (E.D.
Pa. 2001) (concluding that Ontario was an adequate alternative forum).
94. See In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 208 F. Supp. 2d 74, 91 (D. Mass. 2002);
In re Cinar Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (declining to adopt
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Second, of course, they are enabled by the claim aggregation and optout mechanisms established by U.S. procedural law. Some courts
have concluded that legal systems lacking both of these features do
not afford a meaningful remedy to class action
plaintiffs, and on that
95
basis have held foreign fora to be inadequate.
ii.

Relevant Interest Factors

Courts deciding cross-border securities cases examine the full
range of public and private-interest factors that are presented by international litigation. For instance, courts consider the location of
relevant documents; the availability of witnesses; 96 the burden of jury
duty; and so forth. 97 One public-interest factor has emerged as particularly important in the securities context: the interest of the United
States in having its securities laws enforced. While courts do not
weigh this factor uniformly, many have concluded that, because of
the mandatory and regulatory nature of the federal securities laws,
the country's interest in having those laws applied is particularly
strong. 98 As in other kinds of litigation, securities claims involving
U.S. plaintiffs are less likely to be dismissed-not just because of the
general presumption in favor of their choice of forum,99 but because
a fixed rule regarding adequacy in that situation); Trafton v. Deacon Barclays de Zoete
Wedd Ltd., No. C 93-2758-FMS, 1994 WL 746199, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
95. See, e.g., Lernout & Hauspie, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 92 (expressing an unwillingness
to force thousands of U.S. purchasers to file individual suits in Belgian court); DeRensis v.
Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accts, 930 F. Supp. 1003, 1007-09 (D.N.J 1996) (holding
that the absence of these features of U.S. class action law rendered the Canadian system inadequate). Accord Trafton, 1994 WL 746199, at *11-12 (recognizing that in cases where an
alternative forum would deny plaintiffs the right to bring a claim, such alternative jurisdiction is not adequate (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981))). But see
Beddome v. DeYoung, 707 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding the analogous system in
Canada adequate); In re Cinar Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (assuming arguendo that the Canadian system was adequate, but later refusing dismissal based
on analysis of the Gilbert factors).
96. See, e.g., Fustok v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 546 F. Supp. 506, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (documents and witnesses located in Switzerland). Cf. In re Corel Corp. Inc. Sec.
Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 363, 366-67 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (acknowledging that many witnesses
and documents were in Canada, but holding that insufficient to tip the balance strongly
enough away from the plaintiff's chosen forum).
97. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (setting out the range of
interest factors relevant to the convenience analysis).
98. See Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group, Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1993)
("While appellants are correct in asserting that United States courts have an interest in enforcing United States securities laws, this alone does not prohibit them from dismissing a
securities action on the ground of forum non conveniens."). Cf DiRienzo v. Philip Servs.
Corp., 294 F.3d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 2002) (identifying the "strong public interest" of the United
States in enforcing its securities laws as a relevant public interest factor).
99. In general, the plaintiff's choice of forum will be respected, but that presumption is
weaker when the plaintiff is foreign. Piper,454 U.S. at 255.
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the claims of U.S. nationals more strongly implicate local regulatory
interests.100 This analysis becomes particularly important in multinational class actions. When such actions appear driven by the interests

of foreign claimants against foreign defendants, the U.S. interest
seems weaker and the balance may shift in favor of dismissal. 10 1
Conversely, when U.S. claimants file an action that does not include
foreign claimants, the case may survive a forum non conveniens
chal102
countries.
other
to
connections
substantial
given
lenge, even
b.

Motions to Dismiss on the Basis of Comity

In situations in which a lawsuit arising out of the same course
of events has already been filed in another country, U.S. courts sometimes entertain motions to dismiss securities claims on the basis of
comity. Comity claims are similar to forum non conveniens claims,

but rest on a court's decision to recognize a proceeding already underway in a foreign forum, not merely the theoretical possibility of
litigation elsewhere.10 3 This analysis also turns on an examination of
the claim's connection with other jurisdictions, and therefore on the
relative strengh of the U.S. regulatory interest vis-d-vis that of foreign nations. 1 4
B.

The Disposition of Claims Brought in MultinationalClass
Actions
Given all of these different points at which jurisdiction can

become relevant, it is important to identify how courts actually address the conflicts that multinational class actions present. In order to
100. See Corel, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 367 (in a case involving substantial trading on U.S.
exchanges, stating that "the United States has an interest in enforcing its securities laws and
maintaining the integrity of its securities markets").
101. See, e.g., Yung v. Lee, No. 00-CV-3965-DAB, 2002 WL 31008970, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2002) ("While this Court agrees that the allegedly fraudulent SEC filing
by ITNG has potential domestic impact, that impact is dwarfed by the vast majority of conduct in and impact upon China.").
102. See, e.g., In re Cinar Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(noting that all of the plaintiffs were American citizens).
103. See Paraschos v. YBM Magnex Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d 642, 645 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
("The rationale for dismissals based on comity is ... deference to the foreign country's legal, judicial, legislative and administrative system of handling disputes over which it has
jurisdiction, in a spirit of international cooperation.").
104. See id. at 645 (noting that "this is a securities fraud action pertaining to Canadian
registered securities, brought by a purported class of investors who are virtually all Canadian, against predominantly Canadian defendants, concerning a Canadian corporation whose
stock was sold only on Canadian stock exchanges.").
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answer that question, I attempted to identify as full a set as possible
of multinational securities class actions filed over a ten-year period
(from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2005). In assembling that
set, I used the information available at the Stanford Securities Class
Action Clearinghouse, and began by identifying class actions filed 10in5
U.S. court against foreign issuers during the period in question.
Removing a group of cases that dealt with manipulation in the IPO
marketl6 left 115 cases. I then read the complaints in those cases to
ascertain whether the actions were brought on behalf only of investors who had purchased securities on U.S. markets, or whether they
purported to include claims based on foreign-market transactions as
well. Almost forty percent-forty-five complaints-specifically
en07
compassed claims based on foreign transactions. 1
Of the forty-five claims brought on behalf of mixed classes,
fourteen have at the time of this writing generated no specific resolution on the question of subject-matter jurisdiction. 10 8 This is true of
some cases because they were filed relatively late in the time period
under examination, and have not yet reached the stage at which the
issue will be decided. 10 9 In others, the complaints were dismissed in
their entirety for failure to state a claim under the securities laws,
with no independent discussion of the status of claims based on foreign transactions. 110 One claim was withdrawn, along with a parallel
class action that had been initiated in Israel. 111

105. The Clearinghouse, at http://securities.stanford.edu, does not code actions for issuer nationality. In order to identify actions filed against foreign issuers, I (a) input ticker
symbols of companies listed on either the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock
Exchange or NASDAQ, and (b) searched for terms signaling global securities (ADR, ADS,
DR, and GDR).
106. These were included in a single consolidated action before the Southern District of
New York. They dealt only with manipulation in the IPO market and so did not raise the
jurisdictional issue I consider here.
107. See Appendix hereto.
108. See Appendix hereto.
109. This category includes complaints involving the issuers AstraZeneca plc, Rhodia
S.A., Converium Holding AG, and Infineon Technologies AG. The defendants' replies to
these complaints often raise the question of subject-matter jurisdiction, indicating that the
issue is likely to be addressed as litigation proceeds. See, e.g., Bridgestone Corp.'s Reply in
Support of Motion to Dismiss, in Part, for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, In re Bridgestone Sec. Litig., 430 F. Supp. 2d 728 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (No. 03:01-0017), 2007 WL
460660.
110. See, e.g., In re Sierra Wireless, Inc. Sec. Litig., 482 F. Supp. 2d 365, 367 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (dismissing entire complaint against Canadian corporation for failure to state claims
with particularity); In re Nokia Oyj Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 364, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(dismissing complaint against Finnish corporation without deciding issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction over claims by foreign investors).
11. Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, Eisenberg 0. Mgmt. & Consulting, Ltd. v.
Lipman Elec. Eng'g, Ltd., No. I:05-cv-04788-BMC-KAM (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1035/TASE05_01/200696-fDlo0504788.pdf.
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In sixteen cases, all foreign-cubed claims were excluded from
the U.S. litigation. 112 Courts used a variety of procedural mechanisms to achieve this result. In several cases, jurisdiction was decided on a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the foreign claims for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. 113 In some cases, the court considered
jurisdiction at the certification stage, choosing to certify classes that
included only claims based on U.S. market transactions. 114 One case
of forum non conveniens,115 and another
was dismissed on the basis
16
1
on the basis of comity.
In fifteen cases, the class action went forward including all or
some foreign-cubed claims. 117 The record in these cases does not
always reflect a justification for including foreign claims-indeed, in
some there is no suggestion that the defendants ever specifically challenged subject-matter jurisdiction. Eight of the cases, for example,
seem to have settled quite quickly. In these, it is the terms of the settlement notices that indicate the exercise of jurisdiction over foreignmarket based claims. 118 In other cases, however, reported decisions
are available in which courts specifically considered and rejected jurisdictional challenges. 119 Many of the cases that proceeded with a
multinational class involved issuers from Canada, whose regulatory
scheme is relatively similar to that of the United States. But some
involved issuers from countries whose substantive and procedural
law is quite different from U.S. law, including the Netherlands, Germany and France.
112. See Appendix hereto.
113. See, e.g., In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2000) (granting
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as to plaintiffs who did not reside in
the United States or purchase their stock in the United States); In re National Australia Bank
Sec. Litig., No. 03-CV-0567, 2006 WL 3844465, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) (concluding that foreign plaintiffs failed to establish subject-matter jurisdiction over their claims);
Tri-Star Farms Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567, 581 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (granting
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over non-resident purchasers of
U.K. company's ordinary shares).
114. See, e.g., In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 301 (D. Del.
2003) (certifying class including only domestic investors in litigation against German issuer).
115. In re Royal Group Tech. Sec. Litig., 04-CV-9809-HB, 2005 WL 3105341, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2005) (dismissing a complaint against a Canadian issuer).
116. Paraschos v. YBM Magnex Int'l, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(dismissing a complaint against a Canadian issuer).
117. See Appendix hereto.
118. See, e.g., Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Class Action at 3, In re
Intershop Commc'ns AG Sec. Litig., No.C-01-20333-JW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005), avail120333.pdf (defining the
able at http://securities.stanford.edu/1017/ISHP0I/2005930_yOln-0
class to include "(a) all persons who purchased Intershop American Depositary Shares...
on the NASDAQ market and (b) all persons who purchased Intershop common stock.., on
the [German] Neuer Market").
119. These decisions form the basis of the analysis in Part IV below.
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While the size of this set of cases is too small to permit statistical analysis, this look at outcomes in multinational actions yields
two preliminary observations. First, the rate at which such actions
are filed is increasing, 120 and one must assume that U.S. courts will
face the "foreign cubed" problem more frequently in the future. Second, a substantial percentage of multinational class claims are clearing the jurisdictional obstacle. This result is somewhat counterintuitive. After all, what result would one expect if foreign-cubed claims
were brought alone? It is hard to imagine that a U.S. court would exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims of foreign investors,
brought against foreign issuers, for losses suffered in foreign market
transactions. Indeed, courts considering such claims have rejected
them with little difficulty. 121 Yet when such claims are appended to
a class action including plaintiffs whose claims are based on U.S.market transactions, they frequently survive jurisdictional challenge.
The next Part examines the multinational class action claims in more
detail in order to explore that jurisdictional puzzle and its consequences for cross-border securities regulation.
IV.

ESTABLISHING JURISDICTION IN MULTINATIONAL CLASS

ACTIONS

This Part identifies the specific jurisdictional arguments
plaintiffs make in multinational class actions and examines the
courts' analysis of those arguments under the conduct and effects
tests. It concludes that these tests have failed to keep pace with developments in securities regulation in two respects. First, their focus
on geographical location-whether of conduct or of effects-makes
it difficult for courts to adapt them to current conditions in securities
markets. The consolidation of financial markets, the exponential increase in cross-border financial activity, and the effect of technology
on the speed with which information is transmitted have all contributed to a degree of interpenetration among securities markets that undermines the tests' focus on location. 122 Second, their evolution over
120. Of the decisions here reviewed, the rate increased from two complaints filed in
each of 1996 and 1997 to nine in 2004 and eight in 2005.
121. See, e.g., Blechner v. Daimler-Benz AG, 410 F. Supp. 2d 366, 371 (D. Del. 2006)
(after having excluded foreign claimants at the certification stage in In re DaimlerChrysler
AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 301 (D. Del. 2003), dismissing a subsequent action brought
by only foreign parties against the German auto manufacturer); Froese v. Staff, No. 02-CV5744-RO, 2003 WL 21523979, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 7, 2003) (cursory dismissal of an action
brought against German company Hugo Boss by "all foreign" plaintiffs who purchased their
securities on a German exchange).
122. See Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Insider Trading in American Securities
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the past few decades has not kept pace with the evolution of the substantive law governing securities fraud. Courts that have integrated
theories of market efficiency into Rule 1Ob-5 doctrine in the domestic
context are often uncertain whether those theories translate to the
global markets-and, if so, how they intersect with the question of
jurisdiction. Their decisions therefore frequently foreclose, on the
basis of jurisdictional concerns, arguments that are viable under current Rule 1Ob-5 jurisprudence.
A.

Jurisdictionon the Basis of Effects

Some foreign investors involved in multinational class actions
have sought to establish jurisdiction over their claims on the basis of
the effects test. They argue that when fraud occurring outside the
United States causes harm in multiple jurisdictions-adversely affecting the U.S. securities markets as well as one or more foreign sea
curities markets-then the effects within the United States create
123
basis for jurisdiction over all claims arising out of that conduct.
This argument has uniformly failed. Courts considering it often begin by invoking the limitation stated in Bersch: generalized effects (for instance, a diminishment of investor confidence in the securities markets) are not a sufficient jurisdictional basis. 124 Plaintiffs
must point to specific adverse effects (for instance, the artificial elevation of a security's price) leading to the harm they suffered. The
difficulty foreign claimants face is that courts tend to view adverse
effects on the U.S. markets as independent of any adverse effects occurring elsewhere-in other words, they see a change in the price of
a security on the New York Stock Exchange as independent of a
change in the price of that security on a foreign exchange.' 25 For this
reason, courts have generally concluded that while effects felt within
the United States may give rise to subject-matter jurisdiction over the
claims of investors whose harm flowed from those effects (that is, inRegulation: Its Scope and Philosophy in a Global Marketplace, 16 HASTINGS INT'L &
CoMP. L. REv. 175, 183-85 (1993).
123. See, e.g., In re The Baan Company Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C.
2000) (discussing plaintiffs' contention that "the defendants' acts had an effect in the United
States because Baan shares trade in tandem on the world's markets, and therefore the value
of Baan's shares owned by United States residents was affected").
124. See In re Alstom Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (seeking specific harm suffered by a U.S.-interested party, not "generalized adverse consequences
..on the United States economy or financial markets").

125. See, e.g., McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 32 F. Supp. 2d 920, 923 (E.D. Tex.
1999) ("Though losses in the instant case were clearly sustained by American Plaintiffs,
those losses were independent and did not flow from the Canadian purchases. The Canadian
Plaintiffs cannot justify jurisdiction by bootstrapping on independent, American losses").
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vestors who purchased on U.S. markets), they do not automatically
give rise to jurisdiction over the claims of investors whose harm
flowed from effects outside the country. 126 As to effects-based jurisdiction, then, 127 courts have effectively adopted a "transaction location" rule pursuant to which subject-matter jurisdiction over securicountry on whose exchanges the
ties claims presumptively lies in the 128
effected.
was
question
in
transaction
B.

Jurisdictionon the Basis of Conduct

Due to the difficulties in satisfying the effects test, most investors whose claims arise from foreign-market transactions rely on
U.S. conduct as a jurisdictional basis. In some class actions, the only
relevant conduct alleged consists of the public dissemination within
the United States of allegedly misleading information, whether
through filing with U.S. regulatory authorities or otherwise. In others, the foreign claimants allege some additional form of fraudulent
activity occurring within the United States. The application of the
conduct test differs in these two contexts, and I will therefore treat
them separately.
1.

Conduct Consisting of Information Disclosure within the
United States

In some cases, foreign investors have based their claims on
the public dissemination within the United States of documents that
contain misleading information, usually in the form of a filing with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. 129 They argue that the
126. See, e.g., Alstom, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 369-70 (refusing to extend jurisdiction where
fraudulent actions took place overseas and the effects only felt by the U.S. economy or investors generally, because doing so would "address general market conditions rather than
redress specific harms suffered by some U.S.-interested party, a goal specifically foreclosed
by numerous interpretations of the securities laws" (quoting Interbrew v. Edperbrascan
Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1998))); Baan, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (rejecting the
notion that the more generalized effects created when there is a U.S. market in the securities
then confers jurisdiction over the foreign claims as well (citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 988-89 (2d Cir. 1975))). See also Kaufman v. Campeau Corp., 744 F.
Supp. 808, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (non-class action).
127. As discussed below, the conduct test may provide an independent basis for asserting subject-matter jurisdiction over such claims. Therefore, the lack of effects-based jurisdiction in such a case does not necessarily bar their litigation in U.S. courts.
128. This proposition should hold true regardless of whether the issuer in question is a
U.S. or a foreign corporation. Thus, if a plaintiff purchases securities of a U.S. issuer on a
foreign exchange, effects-based jurisdiction would lie in the country in which that exchange
is based.
129. See, e.g., Baan, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
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conduct taking place in the United States causes their harm by distorting the prices at which they transact in the securities on foreign
exchanges. In one such complaint, for example, the plaintiffs alleged
that
defendants made materially false and misleading
statements in the United States . . These SEC filings and press releases affected both the price of Infineon ADSs traded in the United States and the price
of Infineon common stock traded in Germany. The
price of Infineon ADSs and common stock traded in
tandem, so that conduct affecting the price on one exchange affected the price on the other exchange.... 130
Such claims present difficulties with respect to both reliance
and causation, two interdependent elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of
action. To satisfy them, a plaintiff must show that it relied on the defendant's fraud in entering into the transaction in question,
and that
1 31
the fraud complained of actually caused the plaintiff's loss.
a.

Reliance: Toward a 'fraud on the global market" theory?

A plaintiff bringing a securities lawsuit may seek to establish
reliance directly-for instance, by showing that it read and relied
upon a particular prospectus containing a misrepresentation. In class
actions, however, a requirement of "individualized" proof by each
plaintiff would be procedurally impossible, and courts therefore apply a presumption of reliance derived from the fraud on the market
theory. The Supreme Court adopted this presumption in its 1988 decision in Basic v. Levinson, holding that "an investor who buys or
sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is
reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a
Rule lOb-5 action." 132 In class actions, then, plaintiffs generally satisfy the reliance requirement by establishing that they transacted on
an efficient market at a price which therefore reflected the defendants' fraud.
130. Second Amended Complaint For Violations of the Federal Securities Laws at 22,
In re Infineon Techs. AG Sec. Litig., No. C-04-4156-JW (S.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006), available
at http://securities.stanford.edu/1032/IFX04-01/20061011 rO1 c0404156.pdf.
131. These elements are also labeled "transaction causation" and "loss causation." See
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000), for requirements regarding the latter.
132. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
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In actions involving foreign transactions, like domestic ones,
plaintiffs of course have the opportunity to establish direct reliance
on the misleading information. r Typically, however, investors purchasing on foreign markets are unlikely to have seen, read and relied
upon filings made elsewhere. 134 Foreign claimants in multinational
class actions therefore seek to establish presumptive reliance.135 Because the information in question was disseminated in the United
States (as it must be to satisfy the conduct test), and not in the market
on which they actually transacted, they must also establish an additional factor: that information disseminated in one country can affect
market prices in another.
In order to link misrepresentations made in the United States
with effects on securities prices abroad, plaintiffs draw on the efficient market hypothesis. They argue that given the efficiency of
global capital markets, information publicly available in one country
will affect the price of the issuer's securities in other markets as well.
This argument expands the fraud on the market theory into the global
arena. One court summarizes the argument as follows:
Plaintiffs argue that the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions contained in the forms [the
issuer] filed with the SEC constitute significant activity in furtherance of the fraud against [the issuer's] ordinary shareholders because the market absorbed the
information contained in those filings and the price of
both [the issuer's] ADRs and [its] ordinary shares reflected that information. In support of this argument,
plaintiffs point, inter alia, to the fact that [the] ADRs
on the NASDAQ market traded in tandem with [the]
ordinary shares on the London Stock Exchange. They
argue that there was a "seamless, worldwide market"
for [the issuer's] securities and what [the issuer] said
in either London or in the SEC filings affected the
price of [its] ADRs and ordinary shares identically.
Thus, according to plaintiffs, what [the issuer] said to
the SEC in the United States was as significant to the
133. See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (in an individual
claim, noting that information contained within a U.S. filing had in fact been used as the basis of the investment decision).
134. See, e.g., McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 32 F. Supp. 2d 920, 925 (E.D. Tex.
1999) (noting that "[n]ot a single [foreign] Plaintiff has alleged that he or she relied on (or
was even aware of) any statements, reports or filings which emanated from the United
States.").
135. See In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2000) (distinguishing
"specific reliance" from reliance based on the market).
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136
fraud as what it said in the press in London.
This should be a viable argument: as one commentator notes,
"in a technologically-linked investment marketplace . .. virtually
every investment-related action anywhere in the world will promptly
produce significant distortions of investment decisions in every other
,137 In one multinational class action, plaindeveloped country ....tiffs whose claims arose from foreign-market transactions made this
argument successfully. That case was brought against Royal Ahold
NV, a Dutch issuer, by a multinational class some members of which
had purchased their securities on the Euronext market. The defendants argued that these plaintiffs' investment decisions had rested on
information disseminated in Europe, and not on filings with the SEC;
therefore, they had failed to establish reliance on the alleged U.S.based fraud.13 8 The court rejected this argument, noting simply that
SEC filings were the type of document on which investors might reasonably rely. 139 The decision provides no further discussion on this
point: the court neither concluded that the foreign investors had in
fact read and relied on U.S. filings nor stated explicitly that it was referring to reliance on market pricing. Nevertheless, it accepted the
possibility that the filing of information in the United States was a jurisdictional contact sufficient to satisfy the conduct test.
More frequently, however, courts reject "fraud on the global
market" arguments. Interestingly, they generally do so without di140
rectly analyzing whether the relevant markets are in fact efficient.
In one representative case, the court simply stated that applying a
presumption of reliance in such cases would over-extend the jurisdictional reach of U.S. law:
Defendants do not challenge the plaintiffs' reliance on
[the fraud on the market] doctrine, as applied to
American purchasers. However, employing that doctrine to fulfill the requirements of the conduct test
would extend the reach of the 1934 Act too far. It
would allow a foreign plaintiff to sue a foreign defendant based on an extraterritorial transaction whenever
136. Tri-Star Farms Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567, 579 (W.D. Pa. 2002).
137. Langevoort, supra note 14, at 245.
138. In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 362 (D. Md. 2004).
139. Id. (citing Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 1995)).
140. For a case outlining the plaintiff's arguments regarding worldwide efficient markets, see In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (analyst coverage, multiple listings, etc.). See also In re Ashanti Goldfields Sec. Litig., No. CV 000717(DGT), 2004 WL 626810, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing defendant's contention
that the global market in the issuer's securities was not efficient). See generally Smith v.
Dominion Bridge, No. CIV. A. 96-7580, 1998 WL 98998 (E.D. Pa. 1998); In re Laidlaw
Sec. Litig., No. 91-CV-1829, 1992 WL 68341 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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that foreign defendant had filed4 1a fraudulently misleading document with the SEC.1
Thus, the refusal to apply the fraud on the market theory to
foreign-cubed claims is based not on skepticism regarding the efficiency of the global capital markets, but simply on concerns regarding jurisdictional overreach.
This approach may lead to artificial line-drawing in the application of the conduct test, as one recent case involving a German
company illustrates. In 2004, the Southern District of New York
dismissed the claims of foreign purchasers who had purchased stock
in the company on foreign exchanges, holding simply that the fraud
142
on the market theory could not be used to satisfy the conduct test.
The court then affirmed this holding after repleading. 143 Subsequently, an action was filed on behalf of (a) investors who had purchased the company's securities on U.S. markets and (b) U.S. citizens or residents who had purchased the securities on any exchange,
U.S. or foreign. 144 In that action, plaintiffs counsel addressed the
question of fraud on the global market more directly, arguing that
[b]ecause the prices of [the issuer's] securities were
comparable across [the European exchanges, the U.S.
over-the-counter market and the New York Stock Exchange], [the] securities traded in a single, integrated
market .... The prices in this market were set efficiently .... These characteristics [of efficiency] are
sufficient to satisfy Lead Plaintiffs burden, at the
class certification stage, to show that the existence of
the element of relian efficient market-and thus 145
ance-can be proven classwide.
On this basis, the argument proposes that some investors
whose claims arose from forei n transactions should be able to estabV Yet if the market in the issuer's seculish reliance on U.S. filings. 14
141. In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2000). Accord Tri-Star
Farms Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567, 579 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that "'employing the "fraud-on-the-market' doctrine to satisfy the conduct test in [the] class action
lawsuit involving overwhelmingly foreign transactions would extend the jurisdictional reach
of the securities laws too far").
142. In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ.1546 WHP, 2004 WL 2190357, at *18
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
143. In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (declining "to engage in a purely advisory discussion of Plaintiffs' fraud on the market theory").
144. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Class Certification, In re Bayer AG
Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03 CV 1546 (WHP)), 2006 WL
1140263.
145. Id. at 17.
146. Including U.S. citizens, who may have been resident abroad and therefore unlikely
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rities is in fact an efficient, global market, then the jurisdiction plaintiffs seek to establish over only a subset of claims based on foreign
transactions (those entered into by U.S. citizens or residents)
should-under the conduct test-be established over all claims based
on foreign transactions.
Nevertheless, a number of courts have followed this line of
reasoning, and the weight of authority on this point, although taking
the low number of cases into account, suggests that foreign claimants
seeking to establish jurisdiction on the basis of filings within the
United States will not reliably satisfy the reliance requirement under
Rule lOb-5.
b.

Loss Causation: The "More Than Merely Preparatory"
Requirement

The loss causation element of a Rule 1Ob-5 claim requires a
plaintiff to show that the defendant's fraud was a substantial cause of
the losses alleged. In cases with foreign elements, this requirement
intersects with the jurisdictional requirement that the U.S. conduct be
more than merely preparatory in order to justify the application of
U.S. law to the claims.
As discussed above, the Second Circuit distinguished early
between conduct that is "merely preparatory" to a fraud committed in
larger part elsewhere and fraudulent conduct that is engineered and
executed in the United States. 147 Preparatory conduct is insufficient
as a basis of jurisdiction, while conduct crossing that threshold can
support subject-matter jurisdiction even when only foreign interests
are affected. Although this requirement suggests a temporal inquiry-determining whether fraudulent conduct that occurred in the
United States was simply the first step in a fraud that was ultimately
consummated elsewhere-it has been interpreted more as an inquiry
into the relative importance of various steps in a program of fraud. In
determining whether particular conduct is more than merely preparatory, in other words, courts focus on the significance of the U.S.based conduct relative to the overall fraud.
In cases in which the only U.S.-based conduct is the dissemination of information, courts grappling with the question of its overall significance tend to inquire into the location at which the relevant
documents were prepared. In one case, for example, the court concluded that the fraudulent misrepresentations in question had been
to have read U.S.-based disclosure of information.
147. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975).
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authored elsewhere, and their filing in the United States was "merely
incidental;"' 148 in another, that documents filed with the SEC "emanated" from overseas. 149 Issuers, of course, usually prepare their financial reports in their home countries. Because the defendants in
multinational class actions are foreign companies, it is therefore generally the case that the relevant disclosure is prepared outside the
United States. This focus on the location of preparation, rather than
the location of dissemination, makes it unlikely that filings within the
United States 50alone will satisfy the "more than merely preparatory"
requirement. 1
More importantly, the location at which fraudulent disclosures are prepared is, in today's markets, not necessarily a good
measure of their overall significance. Rather, the location of their
initial dissemination is the critical factor, since that is the step that
will actually affect securities prices. 151 Some courts have criticized
the focus on location of preparation for this reason, noting that a locus of preparation test would simply induce foreign issuers to prepare
148. Nathan Gordon Trust v. Northgate Exploration, Ltd., 148 F.R.D. 105, 108
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the misrepresentations in question were authored entirely in
Canada, and that their inclusion in documents filed with the SEC was "merely incidental").
See also In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 105, 111-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (concluding that the misstatements emanated from Germany and could not support jurisdiction over
the claims of a large foreign class); Froese v. Staff, No. 02 CV 5744(RO), 2003 WL
21523979, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that the fraud occurred when the misstatements
were "conceived, engineered, and published in Germany").
149. Kaufman v. Campeau Corp., 744 F. Supp. 808, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (finding that,
where the fraud emanated from Canada, and the only U.S.-based conduct was the inclusion
of alleged misrepresentations in filings and other public information, such conduct was too
"insubstantial in comparison to [alleged foreign conduct]" to justify jurisdiction). See also
Societe Nationale d'Exploitation v. Salomon Bros. Int'l Ltd., 928 F. Supp. 398, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding no jurisdiction when "the bullet was fired from places abroad" (citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 398, 986-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1996))); cf Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversing the district court's dismissal due
to lack of jurisdiction after accepting "plaintiffs' largely uncontested allegations of conduct
consummating the fraud in the United States as true"); Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F.
Supp. 2d 452, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that jurisdiction was proper where a party's administrative services were "created, managed and operated in the United States"); CLAlexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 709 F. Supp. 472, 478-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(determining that U.S.-based conduct was more than mere "field work" performed by a local
office and "that a preponderance of the fraudulent statements alleged here emanated from
the United States," and holding that this, combined with the fact that "the securities are those
of a domestic company," was enough to warrant the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction).
150. See, e.g., In re Yukos Oil Co. Sec. Litig., No. 04 Civ. 5243(WHP), 2006 WL
3026024, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) ("Although the Complaint alleges that Yukos filed
its 2002 Annual Report with the SEC... that document is not alleged to have been prepared
in the United States .... [I]n this putative class action challenging a raft of allegedly misleading statements, a single SEC filing by a foreign corporation is not a 'substantial act[ ] in
furtherance of the fraud' sufficient to confer federal subject matter jurisdiction." (quoting
Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983))).
151. Cf Langevoort, supra note 119, at 186 (suggesting a focus on the source of corporate disclosure, presumptively the site of issuer incorporation).
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misleading statements outside of the United States and then use them
to commit fraud within. 152 In some cases, of course-perhaps in
most cases-the location of preparation and the location of initial
dissemination will be the same. 153 When they are not, however, the
two factors must be differentiated, as an issuer might otherwise be
able to deliberately release information first in the U.S. market in order to affect others. 154 In one recent case, for example, the plaintiffs
alleged that a foreign issuer had "intentionally entangled" U.S. conduct with its foreign listing by using misrepresentations in the United
55
States in order to increase demand for its securities in Hong Kong. 1
Such behavior would provide an example of fraud launched from the
United States to harm foreign investors-behavior that the conduct
test, as currently articulated, encompasses.
2.

Conduct Constituting Additional Fraudulent Activity within
the United States

In light of these difficulties with establishing reliance and loss
causation, claims relying on filings as the only form of U.S. conduct
are unlikely to succeed in establishing subject-matter jurisdiction.
Many foreign claimants in class actions therefore allege not merely
the dissemination of misleading information within the United States
but some additional conduct occurring there. Such conduct ranges
from actions taken in the marketing of the securities (for example,
investor presentations) to the preparation of financial information to
ongoing business activities of the issuer.
In some cases, foreign claimants identify as relevant conduct
the U.S. business activities of a foreign defendant that are later misleadingly characterized in filings or other publicly available information. 156 In an action against the Finnish company Nokia, for exam152. See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Gaming
Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Cf Langevoort, supra note 119,
at 186 (arguing that "at least regarding corporate disclosure policy[, subject matter jurisdiction should be] based not on the alleged violation's impact but on its source").
153. See, e.g., In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(noting that the choice not to disclose, and the publication of misleading financial data, all
occurred in France, with "republication" in the United States a secondary matter); Tri-Star
Farms Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577-78 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (noting that the
alleged fraud originated in England, as statements were initially published in the foreign
press, with any U.S. conduct being insignificant).
154. This would catch a particular category of cases that one might characterize as fraud
"launched" from the United States.
155. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at
36, In re China Life Ins. Co. Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 04-CV-02112(TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9,
2006).
156. See In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 359 (D. Md. 2004)
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pie, the plaintiffs stated that "[i]n addition to the substantial U.S.
conduct in furtherance of the fraud, Nokia has a vast U.S. presence
that justifies the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims of all plaintiffs who, relying on the health and value of
Nokia's substantial U.S. businesses, acquired Nokia securities traded
on foreign markets, and were defrauded by defendants' misrepresentations."' 57 This argument suggests that if misleading disclosure relates to the activities of a foreign issuer's U.S. operations, then, regardless of where that disclosure was prepared, one may characterize
the relevant conduct as U.S.-based. Courts are generally unimpressed by these arguments, finding that they conflate fraudulent
nondisclosure
or misrepresentation with non-fraudulent business ac15 8
tivity.
In the cases in which U.S.-based conduct was held to create a
sufficient jurisdictional basis, that conduct was generally both substantial and directly related to the ultimate fraud. In litigation against
the French conglomerate Vivendi, for example, it was shown that the
company's CEO and CFO had relocated to New York in order to
manage a series of acquisitions of U.S. companies. The plaintiffs alleged that false and misleading statements were made in order to inflate the price on foreign exchanges of Vivendi securities, which
were being used to finance those acquisitions. On that basis, the
court concluded "that the U.S. based conduct was integral and not
merely preparatory to" the fraud directed at foreign purchasers on
foreign exchanges.' 59 In the In re Gaming Lottery litigation, similarly, the court found that the defendant's allegedly illegal operation
of a U.S. subsidiary, and improper attribution of the earnings from
that subsidiary, were the "very factual predicates [lying] at the heart

(noting that the Second Circuit has on different occasions looked to these different stages).
157. Consolidated Class Action Complaint for Violations of Federal Securities Laws at
17, In re Nokia OYJ (Nokia Corp.) Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No.
04 Civ. 2646), 2005 WL 578385.
158. See, e.g., Alstom, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 394 (stating that the relevant conduct was not
the various United States activities "[i]n and of themselves," but rather the nondisclosure and
misrepresentations regarding that activity); Tri-Star Farms, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 578-79
("Marconi's United States business operations were not themselves fraudulent. Rather, the
fraud arises from the representations defendants did or did not make about those operations.").
159. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571(RJH), 2004 WL
2375830, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2004) (referring to 2003 opinion); id. at *7 n.6 (stating
that the officers "purposely moved to and operated Vivendi from the United States allegedly
to better implement a fraudulent scheme"). See also Second Consolidated Amended Class
Action Complaint, In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Lit., No. 01-CV-1855 (RMB)
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2002), availableat http://securities.stanford.edu/1017/NT0l/2002118_- r0
Ic_01 1855.pdf (alleging the use of artificially inflated shares as currency for the acquisition
of companies).
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160
of plaintiffs' case."

C.

Identifying the Assumptions Courts Make in Multinational
Cases

The decisions reviewed above reveal certain assumptions that
courts make when they think about jurisdiction, and the particular
regulatory interests to which they respond. Understanding these assumptions will assist in predicting the future course of jurisdictional
analysis absent legislative guidance and in evaluating possible solutions to regulatory conflict.
In this section, I temporarily set aside the bivalent conduct/effects framework in an attempt to ascertain precisely the regulatory interests to which courts respond in making jurisdictional decisions. In doing that, I will refer to the various transaction
constellations illustrated in the following chart:

160. In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). See also
Alstom, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (accounting fraud "concocted" in the United States and concerning U.S. operations); In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 764
(E.D. Va. 2004) (finding sufficient conduct within the United States to justify jurisdiction).
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Assumption #1: The Interest in Protecting U.S. Investors and
U.S. Markets is Not Diminished When Foreign Investors and
Markets are Also Affected

Judicial treatment of multinational class actions reveals one
core assumption: courts are not willing to deprive U.S. investors who
purchase securities on U.S. markets of a remedy under U.S. law.
This is true even if the issuer in question is a foreign company, and
even if the fraudulent conduct complained of took place outside the
United States. Moreover, it is true even if the conduct in question
caused significantly more harm to foreign investors than to U.S. investors. This is not to suggest that courts do not consider the relative
strength of an issuer's contacts with different countries. The decisions pay careful attention to factors such as the percentage of investors located in the United States versus abroad, 16 1 the presence of in161.

See In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 81 F. Supp. 2d 75, 83 (D.D.C. 2000) (in a discovery
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tent to market the relevant securities in the United States, 162 and the
extent of an issuer's business operations in the United States. 163 But
such analysis is generally undertaken with an eye only on the claims
based on foreign transactions-that is, courts weigh these factors in
determining whether a class should be expanded to encompass foreign claimants, but not to question the jurisdictional status of claims
based on U.S. transactions.
In the Gaming Lottery litigation, for instance, the court noted
that over 50% of the Canadian issuer's common shares were held in
the United States, and for that reason felt comfortable certifying a
class that included foreign claimants. 164 In the Bayer litigation, by
contrast, the court found that only 8% of the issuer's common shares
were held in the United States. 165 Primarily on that basis, it excluded
the foreign claimants from the class. Even in the latter case, however, the court did not consider the possibility of dismissing the U.S.based claims on the basis that the entire litigation more properly belonged in Germany, the issuer's home166jurisdiction and location of the
vast majority of its shareholder base.
2.

Assumption #2: The Protection of U.S. Law Extends to
Foreign Investors Who Transact on U.S. Markets
Claims falling into the upper right-hand box of the chart-

order, noting that the percentage of shares traded on NASDAQ, as compared to the percentage traded on foreign markets, would be relevant to determining the U.S. interest as the forum).
162. See, e.g., In re Yukos Oil Co. Sec. Litig., No. 04 Civ. 5243(WHP), 2006 WL
3026024, at * 11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006). See also CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v.
Goldfeld, 709 F. Supp. 472, 477-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (considering claims of U.K. investors
arising out of a private placement in the United Kingdom, but concluding that the transaction
was in essence predominantly a U.S. transaction-U.S. issuer, ultimate intent to re-sell into
the United States).
163. See In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 353 (D. Md. 2004)
(noting that 74% of the Dutch corporation's sales were generated in the United States, and
calling it "a primarily United States based company" (citing Consolidated Amended Securities Class Action Complaint at 57, In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. Litig., 351 F.Supp.2d 334
(D. Md. 2004) (No. CIV. 1:03-MD-01539), 2004 WL 2358943)).
164. Gaming, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 75, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
165. In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). See also In
re Nat'l Australia Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) (no jurisdiction over the foreign claimants, noting that "the aggregate value of the ADRs represented a mere 1.1% of NAB's nearly one-and-a-half billion ordinary shares").
166. In the one counter-example among the set of multinational class actions, a court
dismissed the claim of a New York resident purporting to represent all purchasers, noting (a)
the absence of any U.S.-based conduct and (b) that the investor had purchased its shares of
the foreign issuer through the over-the-counter market rather than on an exchange. Burke v.
China Aviation Oil (Singapore) Corp., 421 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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foreign investor, U.S.-based transactions-present a somewhat
weaker case for jurisdiction, as one must assume that in adopting
anti-fraud legislation Congress was less concerned with the welfare
of foreign investors than with that of Americans. Nevertheless, the
United States does have a regulatory interest in such cases. In order
to encourage foreign investment in U.S. markets, domestic securities
laws must provide all investors with the same level of regulatory protection in the event of fraud. Thus, even though these cases involve
significant foreign contacts-particularly when the fraudulent conduct complained of occurs outside the United States-the fact that an
investor has transacted on a U.S. exchange invokes a domestic regulatory interest.
Early cases were not entirely consistent in addressing the
status of foreign investors in U.S. markets. In considering the application of the effects test when foreign conduct harmed individuals in
the United States, the Second Circuit in Bersch seemed to treat the
nationality of the investor as relevant. 167 Other decisions viewed
residency, not nationality, as the determinative factor, noting the potential Constitutional problems in treating resident aliens differently
from citizens. 168 The decisions in the multinational class actions reviewed here reflect a clear assumption that it is the location of the
relevant transaction that matters in this context, with the courts affording foreign investors 169
the same protection as U.S. investors if they
trade on U.S. exchanges.
3.

Assumption #3: All U.S. Investors in a Certain Security
Should Be Treated Equally
In cases in which a U.S. investor purchases securities on a

167. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that
the securities laws "[a]pply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the
United States whether or not [conduct] of material importance occurred in this country").
But see lIT v. Comfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980) (Judge Friendly, also the author of
the Bersch opinion, stated that "[n]one of our cases or any others intimate that foreigners
engaging in security purchases in the United States are not entitled to the protection of the
anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.").
168. See, e.g., Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders v. Banque Paribas London,
147 F.3d 118, 128 n.12 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that while there was no need to protect mere
transients, foreign citizens resident in the United States should be afforded the same protection as U.S. citizens).
169. See, e.g., In re Yukos Oil Co. Sec. Litig., No. 04 Civ. 5243 (WHP), 2006 WL
3026024, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) (dismissing claims of foreign purchasers who
bought in foreign transactions, but not the claims of a foreign citizen/resident who bought
ADRs in the United States). But see In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D.
76, 105-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (excluding German and Austrian investors even, apparently, if
they purchased ADRs).
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foreign exchange, the core regulatory interest (protecting U.S. investors who purchase securities on U.S. markets) is not implicated. An
investor who purchases on a foreign exchange relies upon the fairness and integrity of that exchange-conditions that cannot be affected by U.S. law. 170 Surprisingly, however, courts that excluded
the claims of foreign investors from multinational class actions often
permitted U.S. investors to remain in the class although their losses
were suffered as a result of foreign trading. 171 These results reveal
another assumption courts make in addressing these cases: they are
unwilling to discriminate among U.S. investors based on the location
of their trading. In other words, once a class action is underway,
courts are inclined to extend U.S. law for the protection of all U.S.
investors in a certain security.
V.

RE-EXAMINING THE STATUS OF FOREIGN CLAIMANTS IN
MULTINATIONAL CLASS ACTIONS

This Part reaches three primary conclusions regarding the
treatment of claims based on foreign trading. First, as currently formulated, the conduct test does create a jurisdictional basis for at least
some foreign-cubed claims. Second, the exercise of that jurisdiction
will in many cases create significant conflict with the regulatory regimes of other countries. Third, doctrines that might assist courts in
mitigating such conflict are, at least today, not sufficient to that task.

170. It is also difficult to imagine that investors would expect U.S. regulatory law to follow them in their foreign trading, especially given the level of sophistication of investors
involved in cross-border investment.
171. See, e.g., In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 476, 478
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (defining class to include purchasers of ADSs or residents of the United
States who purchased ordinary shares in London); Tri-Star Farms Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC, 225
F. Supp. 2d 567, 581-82 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (allowing claims of U.S. citizens or residents who
purchased shares on the London or another foreign exchange); In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig.,
103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2000) (dismissing claims only of investors who neither resided
in the United States nor purchased their securities on U.S. markets); Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion for Class Certification, In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 105
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03 CV 1546 (WHP)), 2006 WL 1140263 (including in the class all
U.S. citizens and residents who had purchased Bayer securities on any exchange, whether in
the United States or in another country); In re Philip Servs. Corp. Sec. Litig., Notice of
Pendency of Class Action at 2, Proposed Settlement and Settlement Hearing, No. 98 CV 835
(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2006) availableat http://securities.stanford.edu/1006/PHV98/20
061218_rOln_99835.pdf (including "all persons or entities who ... purchased the common
stock of Philip on any Canadian stock exchange and were residents or citizens of the United
States at the time of said purchase").
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Conduct-BasedJurisdictionOver Foreign-CubedClaims

U.S. securities regulators and courts recognize that information flows and cross-listings can create an efficient global market, at
least in heavily traded securities. They must therefore accept as a
factual proposition that fraudulent misrepresentations or nondisclosures in one country can affect market prices in another. On its own
terms, then, the conduct test will create a jurisdictional basis for foreign-cubed claims in some cases: that is, investors in foreign markets
will sometimes be able to establish that fraudulent conduct occurring
within the United States affected the price at which they traded and
thereby caused them harm. In order to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over such claims, however, they must also establish that the
application of U.S. law to their claims will serve a legitimate regulatory interest of the United States. 172 While there is no compensatory
interest at stake when foreign claimants are involved, some foreigncubed claims do implicate a deterrence interest of the United States.
The expansive application of the traditional conduct test was
grounded in the notion that courts should not permit the United States
to be used as a launching pad for fraud directed elsewhere. 173 As
many decisions observe, this policy protects U.S. interests only indirectly-by encouraging reciprocal protection against fraud by regulators in other countries, for example.1 74 However, multinational class
actions point to a more compelling reason to regulate fraudulent conduct based in the United States. For issuers that maintain a dual listing, it is possible, given the internationalization of the capital markets, to engage in manipulation in one country in order to reap
benefits in another. 175 Indeed, this possibility is implied by one of
the reasons that companies seek cross-listing to begin with: information made available in one country can affect the valuation of an is-

172. Cf Andrew Longstreth, Coming to America, LITIG. 53, 53 (2006) ("As the market
for securities becomes more global and more linked, it does become a little artificial to say
'Well, only shares that are purchased in the U.S. exchanges are deserving of compensation
and not people who bought on another exchange,' when they're really two portals to the
same market." (quoting Merritt Fox)). This point about artificiality is indisputably true, but
begs the critical question: should U.S. courts apply U.S. securities law in order to compensate investors who transacted on foreign exchanges?
173. See supratext accompanying notes 29-32.
174. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977). But see Dodge, supra note 16, at
115-16 (discussing ways in which the policy discourages reciprocity).
175. See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint
at 35, In re China Life Ins. Co. Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 04-CV-02112 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9,
2006), 2006 WL 551381 (alleging that marketing efforts in the United States resulted in
hype that affected the issuer's prices on the Hong Kong market as well, and that "even in its
American filings, [the issuer] made statements directed at foreign investors").
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suer's securities in other markets as well. 176 If U.S. law extends only
to claims arising out of U.S. transactions, such fraud would be insufficiently deterred if the impact of the fraud in other markets outstripped whatever damages were paid to U.S. investors. This would
in turn necessitate additional outlays for enforcement activity within
the United States, whether through regulatory or judicial action, even
if any resulting compensation flowed only to U.S. investors. Thus,
there is a specific U.S. interest in addressing foreign-cubed claims
arising out7 of U.S.-based conduct if that conduct also affects the U.S.
17
market.
Additionally, the United States has an interest in serving a
goal it shares with other countries: achieving the efficient resolution
of disputes that touch multiple jurisdictions. It is important in this
connection to recognize that multinational class actions do not implicate, or implicate only to a lesser degree, the Bersch concern regarding U.S. judicial resources. Litigation that goes forward with a class
of U.S. investors will use most of those resources whether foreign investors are included or not. 178 In addition, there are two positive
benefits to expanding subject-matter jurisdiction to encompass all
claims arising out of the same fraudulent conduct. First, it would reduce litigation over jurisdiction itself.179 Second, if foreign claim176. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of CrossListings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102
COLUM. L. REv. 1757 (2002).
177. This argument regarding global under-deterrence has been made in the antitrust
context as well. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, TransnationalRegulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J.
INT'L L. 251, 260-61 (2006) (describing arguments that inclusion of claims by foreign plaintiffs promotes global deterrence); Ilana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action
Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy-PermittingForeign Claimants to be Members of Class
Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1563, 1588-91 (2005) (arguing that deterrence is a global problem and the exclusion of foreign plaintiffs lessens the
likelihood that global corporations will be prevented from committing actions that would
ultimately harm U.S. investors); Alvin K. Klevorick & Alan 0. Sykes, United States Courts
and the Optimal Deterrence of InternationalCartels: A Welfarist Perspectiveon Empagran
37-42 (Cowles Found. Yale Univ., Discussion Paper No. 1617, 2007; Yale Univ., Law and
Econ. Research Paper No. 340, 2007; Stanford Univ., Law and Econ. Olin Working Paper
No. 338, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-963394 (outlining the argument that
excluding foreign plaintiffs from cartel litigation underdeters, and suggesting additional factors to consider in assessing the full welfare effect of including foreign-based claims in U.S.
litigation). See also Clark Yao, Equal Treatment of Foreign Shareholdersin Transnational
Securities Class Actions against a Foreign Issuer-a Chinese Example (The Berkeley Elec.
Press
Legal
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
948,
2006),
available at
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/948 (arguing that excluding foreign shareholders from
U.S. class actions against a foreign issuer creates unfair discrimination between the issuer's
U.S. and non-U.S. shareholders).
178. Cf Langevoort, supra note 14, at 247, 249; Brian P. Murray & Maurice Pesso, The
Accident of Efficiency: Foreign Exchanges, American DepositoryReceipts, and Space Arbitrage, 51 BUFF. L. REv. 383, 390 (2003).
179. See Weintraub, supra note 11, at 1817. Of course, a clear rule excluding all for-
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ants chose to add their claims to U.S. class actions rather than initiate
separate proceedings in the country on whose market they traded, it
would reduce duplicative litigation over the same sets of events.
These regulatory interests support the exercise of subjectmatter jurisdiction over all claims within a multinational class under
the following circumstances: (a) there is a U.S. market in the securities, (b) that market is part of an efficient global market in the securities, and (c) fraudulent conduct affecting the global market occurs
within the United States.
This application of the conduct test would account for the realities of the global marketplace and take seriously the need to address cross-border securities fraud. It would not, however, be easy to
implement. It would require investigation into questions including
the precise level of integration between particular securities markets, 180 the location at which particular information was first disseminated, 181 and the efficiency of other securities markets in absorbing that information. 182 In addition, the wide variation in listing and
trading patterns among issuers will generate further concerns. 183 Finally, whether fairly or unfairly, courts are likely to resist asserting
subject-matter jurisdiction in cases that suggest overreaching. 184 The
presence of a U.S. regulatory interest will not diminish the courts'
perception that something is awry when a large group of foreign
claimants piggybacks on litigation initiated by a small number of
U.S. claimants-when, as the Second Circuit put it, "a very small tail
may be wagging an elephant."' 185 The next section turns to a closer
examination of these concerns.

eign claims would reduce litigation over jurisdiction just as well. See also discussion infra
Part VI.
180. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 76, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (outlining a debate between plaintiffs' and defendants' experts on the level of integration between the U.S. and Paris stock exchanges).
181. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
182. Such analysis would implicate the more general recent debate regarding proof of
efficiency at the class certification stage. See Roberta S. Karmel, When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed in Securities Class Actions?, BUSINESS LAWYER (forthcoming Nov.
2007) (manuscript at Part IV), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1001 743#PaperDownload.
183. For instance, a court might wish to treat differently a foreign issuer whose U.S.
shareholders invested through a sponsored and heavily marketed ADR program and one
whose U.S. shareholders invested through an unsponsored program maintained by a brokerdealer. See Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 371 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing this
distinction in connection with analysis of personal jurisdiction over a foreign issuer based on
its
solicitation of U.S. investment).
184.

See supra Part IV.B.I.a.

185.

lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 n.31 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Some countries already recognize securities class actions, and
186
more are in the process of developing group litigation procedures.
The extension of U.S. subject-matter jurisdiction to cover the claims
of investors based on trading in those countries creates the potential
for jurisdictional overlap: the possibility that a foreign claimant
would be able to join a class action either in its home jurisdiction or
in the United States. Such overlap theoretically presents the possibility of duplicate recovery, as a court in one country cannot enforce in
other jurisdictions an order to release all future claims as a condition
of settlement or judgment. 187 However, systems that themselves use
class actions are likely to enforce claim preclusion in such cases. In
addition, as some of the multinational class actions illustrate, this difficulty can be overcome through coordination among affected courts.
In cases in which parallel actions had already begun in Canada, for
example, some U.S. courts have addressed this question directly by
seeking approval of settlements from the Canadian courts. In one
such case, the settlement notice listed four related actions-one in the
Southern District of New York, and one each in Ontario, Quebec and
British Columbia-and noted that the settlement was contingent upon
approval of all the courts involved. 188 This kind of negotiated settlement could be used to eliminate the possibility of duplicate recovery.
A second and more intractable problem is the possibility of
forum shopping. The concern here is that if a U.S. court were to find
subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign claims, then a foreign investor would be able to forum shop, choosing which action to join on the
186. See Stefano M. Grace, Strengthening Investor Confidence in Europe: U.S.-Style
Securities Class Actions and the Acquis Communautaire, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 281,
290-97 (2006) (discussing recognition in Europe); Posting of Ted Allen to Risk & Govern-

ance Blog, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2006/03/ (Mar. 7, 2006) (discussing legislative developments in Australia, Canada, South Korea, Israel, Sweden, Germany, Italy, and the
Netherlands).
187.

See suprapp. 15-16 (discussing claim preclusion).

188.

Notice of Certifications in Canada and Proposed Settlement of Class Actions, In re

Nortel Networks Sec. Litig, No. 01-CV-1855(RMB), 2002 WL 1492116 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4,
2002), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1017/NT01/2006721_rOln-011855.pdf
See also In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 715 (D.N.J.

2007) (noting that a settlement agreement filed in the Amsterdam Court of Appeals, which
would resolve all claims of non-U.S. purchasers, was "conditioned in part on" the U.S. district court's decision whether or not to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over those
claims).

2007]

MUL TINA TIONA L CLASS A CTIONS

basis of probable outcome. 189 Given that the substantive and procedural law of the United States currently provides certain advantages
to plaintiffs as compared to the law of other systems, this might lead
to the undesirable result of centralizing litigation in U.S. courts. 190 In
this regard, it is important that it is partly the central assumption of
U.S. courts-that U.S. investors who purchase securities on U.S.
markets should not be deprived of a remedy here-that creates the
possibility of multiple parallel proceedings. Until the United States
is ready to contemplate a system in which even the claims of U.S. investors, based on U.S. trading, are subject to the laws of another
country, it is inappropriate to solve the problem of multiple proceedings by suggesting that they all take place in U.S. courts.
2.

Conflict with Countries that Do Not Recognize
Class Actions

The concerns raised when foreign claims are appended to a
U.S. class action are particularly acute when the investments in question took place in a country whose laws do not permit class actions
(or, perhaps, private claims generally) under securities law. Although the central concerns addressed by anti-fraud rules may be the
same across systems, 191 many differences remain both in specific
rules and in the broader cultural approaches that infuse the regulatory
choices of other countries. 192 Some countries prefer public proceedings over private litigation as the primary enforcement mechanism;
others recognize private rights of action under securities laws but not
group litigation. 193 In addition, the United States is unusual in recognizing presumed reliance based on the fraud on the market theory,
rather than requiring investors to prove actual reliance on misleading
information.19k Thus, courts and commentators have from time to
time worried about the foreign relations implications of extraterrito189. See Philip Anisman & Garry Watson, Some Comparisons Between Class Actions in
Canada and the U.S.: Securities Class Actions, Certification,and Costs, 3 CANADIAN CLASS
ACTION REV. 467, 521 (2006) (discussing some reasons a Canadian investor might choose to
join a U.S. class action rather than a Canadian one).
190. For a discussion of the foreign relations implications of such an outcome, see Buxbaum, supra note 174.
191. See Langevoort, supra note 14, at 260 n.70.
192. Id. at 182-83 (noting that the U.S. approach both to the definition of fraud and to
possible sanctions will strike other nations as troublesome); id. at 246 (providing specifics
on fraud rules).
193. See Bassett, supra note 71, at 625, 628 (describing such systems).
194. Although Canadian courts have declined to establish a presumption of law based
on the fraud on the market theory, some have suggested that reliance on market prices might
be inferred from the facts in a particular case. See Anisman & Watson, supra note 186, at
500.
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195
rial application of securities law.

It must be said that, despite such foreboding, the extraterrito-

rial application of U.S. law in the area of securities regulation has
simply not generated the same level of difficulty and hostility as extraterritorial regulation in other areas. 19 6 I believe this is going to
change, particularly in the class action context. Although foreign
claimants have long had the ability to seek inclusion in U.S. class ac-

tions, they have been exploiting that opportunity more frequently in
recent years. Class action complaints increasingly include not merely
general allegations broad enough to include foreign claimants, but
specific allegations directly addressing their status. In addition, as
noted above, foreign investors frequently seek appointment as lead
plaintiffs, whether alone or in conjunction with U.S. co-leads. This
expanding involvement of foreign claimants may be traced in large
part to efforts of the U.S. plaintiffs' bar to cultivate foreign investors. 197 As several recent media reports have noted, some of the ma-

jor plaintiffs' firms have opened offices in Europe, the better to serve
European funds and other institutions interested in participating in
U.S. securities litigation. 19 8 U.S. firms are also forming relationships

with foreign firms who can act as local partners in developing that
business. 19 9 Although foreign investors of course seek the assistance

of U.S. counsel on a wide range of issues, it seems inevitable that the
195. Kun Young Chang, supra note 14, at 117-18; Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 45 ALA. L. REv. 927, 957 (1994)
("applying the U.S. securities laws to transactions having only a tangential relationship to
the U.S. risks offending other nations by perpetuating an already problematic image of
American pomposity"); Stevan Sandberg, The ExtraterritorialReach ofAmerican Economic
Regulation: The Case of Securities Law, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 315, 326 (1976) (citing the
"dangers of United States intrusion into a foreign nation's regulation of its securities markets
and American interference with a sovereign state's management of its economy"); Matson,
supra note 14, at 166-68 (identifying political concerns).
196. This may be in part because the damages awardable in securities cases are only
compensatory, as opposed to the treble damages available in antitrust cases, and because the
enforcement of anti-fraud provisions has a different resonance than the enforcement of provisions such as registration requirements, or antitrust regulations shaping ex ante behavior.
See Born, supra note 16, at 47 (noting that, in general, extraterritorial application of securities antifraud rules leads to much less conflict with foreign laws than such application of antitrust law).
195See Longstreth, supra note 172, at 54 ("American class action lawyers are aggressively
pursuing foreign clients. Each plaintiffs firm has its own strategy, but the goal is the same:
Sign up lead plaintiff contenders as clients, boosting the firm's chances of being named lead
counsel and eventually raking in huge attorneys' fees.").
198. Earlier this year, Cohen Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C., a leading plaintiffs
firm, opened its own branch in London. See http://www.cmht.com/london.php.
199. See, e.g., Longstreth, supra note 172, at 54 (reporting an alliance formed between
Labaton Sucharow & Rudoff, a U.S. firm, and TILP International, a German firm representing institutional investors). Prominent U.S. plaintiffs' firms, including Lerach Coughlin
Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, promote their representation of foreign institutional
investors and their affiliations with foreign offices on their websites.
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increased involvement of plaintiffs' firms in foreign markets will
lead to the increased involvement of their clients in U.S. class actions. For these reasons, an expansion of U.S. plaintiffs' firms into
foreign markets will draw unfavorable attention to multinational class
until recently been the subject of only sporadic
actions, which have 200
abroad.
commentary
As I have argued at greater length elsewhere, 20 1 this kind of
jurisdictional conflict is not one whose consequences U.S. courts
should take lightly. They include, first, substantial friction between
different litigation procedures and practices. U.S. entrepreneurialstyle lawyering is viewed with hostility in many other countries. It
depends on procedural mechanisms such as contingency fees that are
not permitted in most other legal systems. When coupled with class
actions-whose opt-out mechanism is seen as contrary to public policy in most countries-it triggers particularly adverse reactions.
Thus, even when there is agreement on the substance of an anti-fraud
rule, other countries may not welcome enforcement through application of U.S. law. Secondly, in the securities field in particular, an expansive approach to multinational litigation presents a specific economic risk. Companies considering cross-listing in the United States
are already wary of opening themselves to the potential burdens of
litigation here. If securities litigation in the United States can encompass even the claims of their non-U.S. shareholders-investors
who transacted in countries where they would not be able to mount
collective litigation-those companies will be even less enthusiastic
about listing in the United States. 20 2 For those whose primary concern lies with the competitiveness of U.S. financial markets, this is a
significant drawback to the application of U.S. law for the protection
of foreign claimants. 20 3 Finally, these cases raise a much wider set of
concerns regarding the role of individual legal regimes in regulating
global activity: to cast it in broad terms, concerns that an expansive
assertion of jurisdiction by U.S. courts plays in other countries as an

200. The likelihood of this emerging conflict is suggested by one incident in 2006 in
which a British pension fund was criticized when its involvement in U.S. litigation was publicized. See David Robertson, City of London Pension Fund Caught in Lawsuit Against BP,
THE TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 10, 2006, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/corpora
telaw/article666940.ece (a U.K. pension fund criticized for participating as a claimant in a
U.S. class action against the U.K. petroleum concern BP; noting the concern of some U.K.
companies that "[U.S.] lawyers are trying to export their no-win, no-fee system to Britain").
201. Buxbaum, supra note 174.
202. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Global Class Actions, NAT'L L. J., June 11, 2007, at 12, 12.
203.

See generally COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE

COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (2006), http://capmktsreg.org/pdfs/ 11.30Co
mmittee_Interim_.ReportREV2.pdf. (discussing various aspects of the "litigation burden" on
issuers in U.S. markets).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[46:14

instrument of regulatory hegemony.204 Unless and until some
mechanism is developed that assures the full participation of other
countries in crafting solutions to global economic misconduct, an agextraterritorial approach to securities fraud remains probgressive2 05
lematic.
C.

Insufficient Means to Manage Conflict

As I have noted above, some courts avoid jurisdictional conflict by simply foreclosing arguments that should in fact be sustainable under the conduct test. Others, however, turn to doctrines more
suited to the resolution of jurisdictional conflict. This section addresses the possibility that such doctrines might be applied to screen
those claims that, while permitted under the conduct test, would create excessive conflict with other countries.
1.

Discretionary Dismissal

As discussed above, claims brought under the U.S. securities
laws are subject to dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens,
or, alternatively, of comity. 20 6 The availability of these doctrines
implies an acknowledgment that, as important as it is, the regulatory
interest embodied in the antifraud provisions can be outweighed by
competing factors. To date, the cases in which such dismissal has
been granted have not been cases involving open-market trading.
They tend to arise out of private securities transactions, and, often,
address claims brought only by investors on foreign exchanges, not
by U.S. investors or by mixed classes. 20 7 Similarly, the one multinational class action that was dismissed on the basis of comity involved
U.S. class members who had invested outside the United States: the
court emphasized that the stock in question was listed only in Canada, and concluded that any U.S. investors who engaged in transactions there were aware that they were purchasing securities regulated
only by the Canadian authorities. 20 8 But a more vigorous application
of these doctrines might be used to steer entire class actions (includ204. See Buxbaum, supranote 174, at 304-05.
205. Id. at 305-06.
206. See supraPart III.A.4.
207. See, e.g., In re Royal Group Tech. Sec. Litig., No. 04 Civ. 9809 HB, 2005 WL
3105341 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2005) (dismissing claims where the two co-lead plaintiffs had
purchased only on the Toronto Stock Exchange).
208. Paraschos v. YBM Magnex Int'l, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646-47 (E.D. Pa.
2000).
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ing claims of U.S. investors as well as claims of foreign investors) to
a single foreign forum.
In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sinochem, 209 it is possible to imagine a more expansive use of forum non
conveniens in multinational class actions. Prior to that decision, most
courts assumed that they must establish personal and subject-matter
jurisdiction before turning to the question of forum non conveniens.
On such a view, the interests of U.S. investors in the application of
U.S. law are squarely before the court as it considers the possibility
of deferring to another forum. If a court were to consider forum non
conveniens first, however, as Sinochem permits, its initial focus
would be on the substantial foreign elements that these class actions
present. It might therefore be more inclined to view multinational
litigation against foreign issuers as belonging more properly in another court, and more willing to dismiss even the claims of investors
who purchased on U.S. markets. 2 10 The question going forward,
then, is whetherforum non conveniens can develop into a useful tool
for avoiding conflict. While this is difficult to predict, the decisions
reviewed here suggest that such a development is unlikely. The assumption that U.S. law must be applied to protect U.S. investors is
very strong 21 1-thus, while courts may seek ways to exclude foreigncubed claims, they will probably not choose a path that would elimilaw for damages arising out of
nate U.S. investors' recourse to U.S.212
exchanges.
securities
U.S.
on
trading
2.

Applying Foreign Law to Foreign-cubed Claims

U.S. courts have typically adhered to the traditional view that
establishing subject-matter jurisdiction under the securities laws requires unilateral rather than multilateral analysis. In other words,
when considering claims with foreign elements, their inquiry is limited to whether those claims fall within the scope of U.S. securities
law. 213 On this view, all claims included in multinational class ac209. See supra note 87.
210. The promotion of forum non conveniens in this sense might have a different effect:
encouraging plaintiffs to revert to straight U.S. classes when suing foreign issuers in order to
minimize the risk that U.S.-based claims will be swept into a dismissal of the entire case.
211. See supra Part IV.C. 1.
212. In addition, where the U.S. market is created by an issuer-sponsored ADR program, the issuer may in the depository agreement have waived its right to object to litigation
in the United States on the basis of convenience. See In re Yukos Oil Co. Sec. Litig., No. 04
Civ. 5243(WHP), 2006 WL 3026024 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006).
213. See Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionat a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982) (explaining this approach in terms of the difference between public interests embodied in regulatory
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tions, whether based on U.S. transactions or foreign transactions,
raise the same yes-or-no question-they either fall within the subjectmatter jurisdiction of U.S. law, or they must be dismissed. A multilateral approach would operate differently: with respect to each
claim, or each class of claims, a court would engage in choice-of-law
analysis to determine whether U.S. law or another country's law
should be applied.
Although a shift to a multilateral choice-of-law approach
would require a significant theoretical realignment, it would not be
impossible. Some courts have in fact already signaled their belief
that U.S. courts could apply foreign law to securities claims. 214 Under such an approach, a court addressing a multinational class action
could create sub-classes, applying U.S. securities law to claims arising out of U.S. transactions in a particular security and applying foreign law to claims arising out of transactions in that security on a foreign exchange. The benefit of such a solution is that it would permit
courts to effectuate the central regulatory interest, by applying U.S.
law for the protection of U.S. investors, while recognizing that foreign-based transactions do not similarly trigger that interest. Secondarily, it would mitigate the forum shopping problem that arises
when foreign claimants seek inclusion in U.S. class actions in order
to avail themselves of more favorable law.
While this solution appears technically possible, it presents
some major difficulties. It would do nothing to ameliorate the procedural conflicts that transnational securities litigation generates-thus,
for example, a plaintiff might shop for a U.S. forum in order to take
advantage of liberal discovery rules. It would also strip global actions of their one real advantage: judicial economy. A single case in
which the court is called upon to apply the law of multiple jurisdictions to the same set of events sacrifices quite a bit in the way of efficiency. Indeed, the choice of law issues presented might actually
prevent the certification of global classes. The potential that claims
within a class will be governed by different substantive laws (in this
context, U.S. securities law and one or more foreign securities laws)
might interfere with two necessary predicates of class treatment: predominance of common questions of law or fact, and superiority of
class action as a method of adjudication. Outside of the securities
area, some courts have refused broad certification on the basis of ju-

law and ordinary private law rules).
214. See, e.g., DiRienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 294 F.3d 21, 31 (2d Cir. 2002) (suggesting that a U.S. court would apply Canadian securities law to the claims of investors who had
purchased the securities there); In re Royal Group Tech. Sec. Litig., No. 04 Civ. 9809 HB,
2005 WL 3105341 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2005).
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dicial management problems; 2 15 others, on the ground that the laws
to be applied were so different from one another that common issues
did not predominate. 216 In class actions involving claimants from
only two or three jurisdictions, choice of law issues might not be fatal
to certification (especially if the securities law of the foreign jurisdiction involved closely resembles U.S. law). In litigation involving
claimants from many different countries, however, or countries
whose laws vary substantially, class treatment might not be available.
All in all, the multilateral approach offers few advantages to prompt
its adoption.
3.

Conclusion

Given the assumptions that courts make in addressing multinational class actions, it is unlikely that these doctrines will assume a
major role in resolving cross-border conflict in securities litigation.
Moreover, even their more frequent application would do little to
mitigate the unpredictability of the underlying jurisdictional analysis.
Thus, as the filing of foreign-cubed claims continues to increase,
multinational class action practice will generate excessive levels of
conflict with other countries, as well as mounting uncertainty for litigants.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE SECOND-BEST SOLUTION?

In addressing foreign-cubed claims, courts must navigate the
intersection of two bodies of law, each entirely judicially created:
substantive anti-fraud jurisprudence based on the implied right of action contained in Rule lOb-5, and jurisdictional tests based on assumptions regarding Congressional intent as to the scope of the Exchange Act. The result, outlined above, has created something of a
Catch-22. Courts troubled by the prospect of jurisdictional conflict
lack clear guidance in resolving it and so are often tempted to draw
artificial lines under the conduct test. On the other hand, courts that
apply the conduct test fairly, recognizing jurisdiction over foreigncubed claims in appropriate circumstances, bring the U.S. system of
aggressive private enforcement into unacceptable conflict with the
regulatory regimes of other nations.
215. For instance, in consumer protection cases where the court would be called upon to
apply the laws of all fifty states.
216.

See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1780-82 (3d ed. 2005).
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In the absence of a negotiated international solution to this dilemma, the best alternative may be to adopt a rule that simply limits
subject-matter jurisdiction under the anti-fraud provisions to claims
arising out of transactions on U.S. markets. This solution would improve the current approach in several ways. First, it would conform
to significant degree with the stance the SEC has taken in regulating
the disclosure required in cross-border securities offerings. In adopting Regulation S,which created a tiered exemption for the sale of securities outside the United States, the SEC focused on the location of
the particular capital market offering, 2 17 noting that "[a]s investors
choose their markets, they choose the laws and regulations applicable
in such markets." 218 While the goals of disclosure laws and the goals
of anti-fraud rules differ, and the scope of application of the relevant
rules might therefore differ to some extent,2 19 a primary focus on
transaction location would yield a more unified approach to the question of regulatory limits. It would also be consistent with the approach recently adopted by the Supreme Court in addressing regulatory conflicts under antitrust law.22D
Second, as many commentators have noted, a transactionbased approach would account for the fact that the price of a security
presumably reflects the level of regulatory protection available in the
market on which it is traded-and that investors transact accordingly. 221 Limiting jurisdiction to fraud claims arising out of U.S.

217. For a discussion of Regulation S,see Choi & Guzman, supra note 14, at 211-15;
Guy P. Lander, Regulation S-Securities Offerings Outside the United States, 21 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 339 (1996).
218. Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, Exchange Act Release
No. 27,942, 55 Fed. Reg. 18306 (May 2, 1990). See also Testy, supra note 193, at 956 ("Arguably, the same considerations that persuaded the SEC to issue Regulation S should also
prompt it to adopt a similar approach" in the anti-fraud context).
219. See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London,
147 F.3d 118, 123, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1998) (distinguishing the scope of the registration requirements from the scope of the anti-fraud provisions); E.On AG v. Acciona, 468 F. Supp.
2d 559, 573-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (distinguishing the scope of the tender offer rules). But see
Testy, supra note 193, at 956-58 (emphasizing the commonalities between the two contexts).
220. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004). But
see In re Royal Ahold NV Sec. Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 356 (D. Md. 2004) (distinguishing Empagran from the securities cases); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 380 F.
Supp. 2d 509, 548 (D.N.J. 2005) (same).
221. Chang, supra note 14, at 123 (noting "the recent approach of the SEC" to protect
U.S. markets over U.S. investors: "Investors who transact abroad would expect protection
from the laws of the country in which the transaction took place."); Choi & Guzman, supra
note 14, at 220, 230 (suggesting the adoption of a "connection test focus[ing] on the location
with the most relation to the actual matching of the buyer and seller," which in the case of
exchange-based transactions would lead to the laws of the exchange's country); Langevoort,
supra note 14, at 257 ("[F]oreign citizens have little reason to expect the protection of U.S.
law, as opposed to the law of the site of the harmful effects.").
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trading would eliminate the ability of investors to purchase securities
under one regime and then take advantage of the more rigorous enforcement regime in the United States by obtaining compensation in
private litigation. 222 Moreover, as Professors Choi and Guzman have
argued, U.S. investors may be better off when they
have a more di22 3
verse array of investments from which to choose.
Implementing a transaction-based approach in a fair and consistent manner would require some adjustment of current practice.
Courts would need to discard the assumption that all U.S. investors
must be treated alike regardless of the market on which they purchased. While jurisdiction would extend to the claims of U.S. investors who purchased in the United States, it would not encompass the
claims of those who chose to invest in foreign markets. 224 Similarly,
only foreign investors who invested in foreign markets should be excluded from multinational class actions. A foreign investor who purchases securities in the United States (for instance, in the form of
ADRs) should not be excluded from resulting litigation on the basis
that a judgment
might lack preclusive effect in that investor's home
225
country.

While this approach would add clarity to jurisdictional analysis and ameliorate regulatory conflict with other nations, it is nevertheless a second-best solution. It fails to address the central dynamic
of cross-border securities fraud, which multinational class actions
present with such particular clarity: the more integrated the securities
markets, the more likely it is that wrongdoers can take advantage of
that integration in order to reap financial benefit-and the less feasible it is to achieve effective regulation with systems, whether regulatory or judicial, built around geographic boundaries. A better solution, however, will not be achieved through the unilateral application
by domestic courts of national regulatory law. It must wait on a
higher degree of conformity in both substantive and procedural law
relevant to private securities enforcement, and on the increased op222. Choi & Guzman, supra note 14, at 221. See also Testy, supra note 193, at 957
(noting that in that case investors might receive "a windfall in the form of more protection
than that for which they actually bargained").
223. Choi & Guzman, supra note 14, at 226.
224. For cases excluding foreign-based claims but including claims of U.S. citizens and
residents who transacted on foreign exchanges, see In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., No. 03 CV
1546(WHP), 2006 WL 1140263 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006); Tri-Star Farms Ltd. v. Marconi,
PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567 (W.D. Pa. 2002); In re Indep. Energy Holdings Plc Sec. Litig.,
210 F.R.D. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.
2000); Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement and Settlement Hearing, In
re Philip Servs. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 98 CV 835 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2006), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/I006/PHV98/20061218_rO1 n99835.pdf.
225. Cf In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (excluding all German and Austrian investors regardless of where they actually invested).
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portunity for coordination among affected states that will flow therefrom.
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APPENDIX

ISSUERS INVOLVED IN U.S. CLASS ACTIONS INCLUDING FOREIGNCUBED CLAIMS

* Class action proceeded including all or some of the foreign-cubed claims
t Class action proceeded but excluded all foreign-cubed
claims
# No specific resolution reached on the question of jurisdiction over foreign-cubed claims at the time of writing
Adecco S.A.
Alstom, S.A.
Asia Pulp & Paper Co.
AstraZeneca plc
Baan N.V.
Bayer AG
Bennett Environmental
Biovail Corporation
Bre-X Minerals
Bridgestone Corp.
Cable & Wireless plc
China Aviation Oil
China Life Insurance
Converium Holding AG
Daimler-Chrysler AG
Danka Business Systems plc
Dominion Bridge Corp.
Elan Corporation
Gaming Lottery Corp.
GlaxoSmithKline plc
Golden Rule Resources
Hugo Boss AG
Independent Energy Holdings

Infineon AG
Intershop Communications
Laidlaw Inc.
Lipman Electronic Engineering
Livent Inc.
Loewen Group
Mamma.com Inc.
Marconi plc
National Australia Bank
Nokia Corporation
Nortel Networks Corp.
Parmalat Finanziaria
Philip Services Corp.
Rhodia S.A.
Royal Ahold N.V.
Royal Dutch/Shell Transport
Royal Group Technologies Ltd.
Sierra Wireless
Tee-Comm Electronics
Vivendi Universal S.A.
YBM Magnex International
Yukos Oil Co.

